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Abstract
We consider banking panic transmission in a two-bank setting, in
which the main propagator of a shock across banks is the informational
spillover channel. Banks are perceived to be positively connected to some
unobserved macroeconomic fundamental. Depositors in each bank are
assumed to noisily observe their banks idiosyncratic fundamental. The
game takes a dynamic bayesian setting with depositors of one bank, mak-
ing their decision to withdraw after observing the event in the other bank.
We show that, if this public event is used for bayesian inference about
the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental, then, in the equi-
librium prole of the game, contagion and correlation both occur with
positive probability, with contagion modeled as a state-contingent change
in the cross-bank correlation. Such endogenous characterisation of proba-
bilistic assessments of contagion and correlation, has the appealing feature
that it enables us to distill between these two concepts as equilibrium phe-
nomena and to assess their relative importance in a given banking panic
transmission setting. We show that contagion is characterised by public
informational dominance in depositorsdecision set.
key Words: Banking Panic Transmission, Informational Spillover, Conta-
gion, Correlation
   
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1 Introduction
1.1 Banking Crises and Introduction to Financial Conta-
gion
Financial systems1 play a fourfold-role in the economy (Allen and Gale (2003)):
They channel savings from where they are in excess to where they are in
need; they allow for intertemporal smoothing of consumption by households
and expenditure by rms; they provide intratemporal insurance against liquid-
ity shocks to households and rms by enabling them to share risks; they allow
for the e¢ cient nancing of protable investment projects.
Ever since the special critique of Fama (1980) about the specialness of banks
or nancial intermediaries as to their relevance in an Arrow-Debreu setup, a
huge body of the literature has surged, validating the role of banks by stressing
on their role in alleviating di¤erent forms of market imperfections (Freixas and
Rochet (2002))2 . As dealers in non-marketable nancial contracts of di¤erent
forms, the nature of a bank s activities3 exposes it to panics or runs, which
occur mainly when depositors, fearing that the bank will be unable to meet its
contractual obligations, decide to withdraw their funds from the bank. Bank
runs remain an accute issue today. While Europe and the United States have
experienced a large number of bank runs in the 19th century and beginning
of the 20th, many emerging markets have experienced severe episodes of bank-
ing crises in recent years. Latin America seems to su¤er from these episodes
once every decade (Chile (1980s), Argentina (mid 1980s, 2002), Mexico (mid
1980s). Other spectacular accounts of banking crises include the South East
Asian u (1997) and the banking distress that plagued the Eastern European
countries (Baltic countries (1992), Bulgaria (1997)). As Gorton and Winton
(2002) note in a recent survey on nancial intermediaries, even countries that
have never experienced bank runs strive hard to pre-empt the likelihood of a
banking crisis from developing by adopting tough lines on regulatory measures,
the costs of contagious e¤ects of banking crises in terms of loss output, nancial
dis-intermediation, dismantling of the payments / settlement system and public
outlays needed to revamp the banking system, being far too high4 .
In this paper, we are concerned with a wider issue surrounding bank runs.
In settings involving multiple banks with common exposure, a collapse of all
banks will legitimately carry symptoms of bank failure due to cross-bank pos-
itive correlatedness and of banks failing exclusively because others have failed.
We are interested in detecting how far, in probabilistic terms, we can attribute
the event as being a case in which the collapse occured solely because the banks
are commonly linked to some common fundamental (correlated bank failures)
1 incorporating nancial markets and nancial intermediaries such as banks.
2Microeconomics of Banking (chapter 2)
3See Note A after references section
4See Note B after references section.
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and how far it is one in which one banks performance has caused the behaviour
of depositors of another bank to change so that the other bank fails (contagious
bank failures). When the notion of causation exists, the spread of a crisis from
one bank to another is dubbed nancial contagion5 . In our knowledge, pa-
pers highlighting contagious and correlated events in one setting, and crucially
to distinguish between the two as equilibrium phenomena, are lacking in the
literature and this contribution is meant to ll that gap.
Globalisation of banking activities is a recent trend plaguing global nance
that highlights the importance of distilling contagious bank ows from correlat-
edness. While our model is a closed-economy version of a nancial system, the
following example may be used to help illustrate the intuition behind the moti-
vation of our work: From the point of an individual bank, greater geographical
dispersion tends to be associated with better share price performance and better
management of idiosyncratic risks. However, while cross-border diversication
of banks seems to be associated with greater stability and better risk manage-
ment practices, the nancial system as a whole, may not become more stable
with the potential linkages across countries having increased. For economies
that have correlated macroeconomic performances, this represents an impor-
tant aspect of nancial fragility especially if they are characterised by heavy
cross-bank penetration. In the event of a nancial crisis across countries, an
ostensible challenge for its policymakers, as part of its overall nancial stability
programme, will be to dissociate the contagious impact of bank failures from the
correlated element of such failures since each element will warrant a di¤erent
policy action. The issue of di¤erentiating between correlation and contagion
will be a major crux of this paper.
.
1.2 Unearthing the Transmission Mechanism implicit in
Models of Banking Contagion
As widely documented in the literature of banking contagion, individual bank
runs may be severe enough to warrant the failure of other banks, making oth-
erwise healthy banks temporarily illiquid and eventually insolvent. Theoretical
papers consider a number of channels that may explain why and how a crisis
may spill over to other institutions. This literature may be divided into two cat-
egories describing the transmission mechanism : real contagionmodels which
stress direct channels connecting banks and pure contagion channels which
stress on informational changes as principal driving cause of multiple bank col-
lapse.
5See Note C after references section.
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1.2.1 Direct Link Models and Pure Contagion Models - Contagion
vs Interdependence vs Correlation
Real contagionor direct-linkmodels of banking purport that banks are di-
rectly connected through the interbank market, either through the exchange
of interbank deposits or through the exchange of interbank loans or through
the payments and settlements infrastructure. Alternatively, banks may be com-
monly exposed to some fundamental which directly a¤ects their asset perfor-
mance. An example of the latter case is the recent deterioration of credit quality
of the U.S subprime mortgage market in 2006. With signicant number of banks
investing in structured mortgage credit products in America, signs of deterio-
ration in credit quality of the subprime segment of the U.S housing sector may
deepen and spread to the structured mortgage sector and ultimately a¤ect these
exposed banks contagiously. A third branch of real contagion models focus on
otherwise dissimilar countries or banks but sharing the same investors. Most
theoretical models of banking contagion with direct links, have been focusing
on the rst branch.
Leaving aside the banking world, real contagion captures the spread of nan-
cial crisis across countries linked through trade and nancial ows. Important
as these conduits of nancial disasters are, these direct linkages were nonethe-
less weak in contagion of the Tequila crisis from Mexico to Argentina and Brazil
in 1994-95, countries in East Asia a¤ected by the crisis of 1997 and the ripple
e¤ect of the Russian default in 1998 on many emerging market economies. This
inability of real contagion models to explain the recent propagation of nan-
cial crises across emerging markets, makes the case for pure contagionmodels
stronger as natural candidate o¤ering pertinent explanation of these events.
Models of pure contagionstress on the di¤erent uses of information, as pos-
sible channel explaining how a failure may propagate from one bank to another,
even though banks are not directly linked through fundamentals. The basic
mechanism propagating shocks across banks is the shift in investor sentiment
through changes in perceptions. Some of the leading explanations for nancial
contagion, especially after the Russian default of 1998, are based on changes
in psychology, attitude, investor behaviour. In fact, many economies that
have experienced nancial contagion recently had strong macroeconomic fun-
damentals and blame the contagious e¤ects they have su¤ered on the harmful
and corruptinginuence of investor psychology in other countries.
The interested reader is requested to read notes D and E after the technical
appendix section of this paper for an idea of pure and real contagion papers in
the literature of banking theory. A natural conundrum in building theoretical
models of nancial contagion is to elaborate on the precise concept of contagion
to be adopted. The latter is crucial for explaining the nature of the transmission
mechanism and for the design of key policies required to contain the undesirable
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e¤ects. There is considerable ambiguity concerning the precise denition of
contagion and di¤erent interpretations of contagion have been provided in the
literature. There is no theoretical or empirical denition on which economists
agree.
Direct-link theories stress on a fundamental-based denition of contagion,
often interpreted as the propagation of shocks through direct linkages connecting
banks. This denition nonetheless stresses on the existence of an underlying
transmission mechanism that remains the same in all states of the world: non-
tranquil states and tranquil states. Thus, direct-link models will describe a
crisis from Brazil to Argentina, for example, as a case of contagious ow. The
Argentinean stock market rose and fell with the Brazilian market during the
crisis of 1999. Brazil and Argentina are located in the same geographical region,
are at the same stage of economic development, have many similarities in terms
of their market structure and in their trade and nancial links patterns. In
all states of the world, these two economies remain strongly connected. Thus,
it is not surprising that a negative shock in Brazil is strongly passed on to
Argentina. If such a transmission represents merely a continuation of the same
cross-market linkages that exist in tranquil and non-tranquil times, then this
crisis does not represent contagion, but rather interdependence. Nonetheless,
direct-link theories will describe this as a case of contagion.
In Allen and Gale (2000) and Dasgupta (2004), banks cross-hold deposits as
insurance against regional liquidity shocks. The main channel of panic trans-
mission is the interbank market in deposits and cross-bank linkages remain the
same before and after a crisis. The main point of such interdependenceis that
in tranquil periods, the interbank market provides the channel for cross-regional
insurance but in crisis periods, the interbank market provides the main conduit
that spreads a crisis from bank to bank. We bypass these conceptual prob-
lems by adopting a modelling structure that yields contagion as a concept that
approaches the spirit of Shift Contagion, concocted by Forbes and Rigobon
(2001). Working on observed trends in Latin America depicting a high degree
of comovement within Latin American economies and across emerging markets
in general, especially the bonds market, Forbes and Rigobon (2001) describe
contagion as one in which the cross-market linkages across countries increase
during a crisis period compared to that of a normal period - the notion of shift
. Thus, in a world with comovements in asset prices, contagion will only be
taken to represent the case when there is an increase in this correlatedness in
certain states of the world (crisis periods) as compared others (normal periods).
Cases in which the cross-market linkages remain una¤ected and continue to ex-
ist in all states of the world, are cases which merely illustrate interdependence
not contagion6 .
6See note F after the references section
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1.3 Brief Summary of our Model
Our paper intends to be a major tour-de-force in the literature of banking panic
transmission by providing a state-of-art account of contagion a¯-la Forbes and
Rigobon (2001), while addressing a number of economic issues that have been
conned to oblivion - and which we believe, are at the core of any study of
banking panic transmission. Our approach is similar to Dasgupta (2004) but
we introduce an incomplete knowledge of the game structure and informational
channel. Banks are modelled a¯-la Diamond and Dybvig (1983) but multiple
equilibria is precluded by the adoption of an incomplete information structure7 .
The model can be subsumed as follows: there are two banks in the economy,
each of which spans a particular region of the economy. At the initial period,
t = 0; depositors in both regions invest their endowment in the bank of their
region. These depositors face liquidity shocks of the Diamond-Dybvig (1983)
type and can consume early or late. There is no aggregate uncertainty about
liquidity shocks in the model. In return for accepting deposits, banks o¤er
depositors demand deposit contracts that allow depositors to withdraw either in
the interim period t = 1 or the nal period t = 2; depending on the realisation
of the liquidity shock (which is only known at the beginning of period t = 1):
Both banks invest in a hedge fund, which consists of two risky portfolios, one for
each bank, at t = 0: The performance of each banks portfolio depends on the
banks idiosyncratic fundamental (e.g the quality of the banks management)
as well as a common macroeconomic fundamental to which both banks are
positively exposed.
Each banks idiosyncratic fundamental and the common macroeconomic fun-
damental are not common knowledge, although their probability distributions
are at time t = 0. Depositors in each bank noisily observe their banks idiosyn-
cratic fundamental through some private signal structure. For each depositor of
a given bank, this private signal contains information about his banks idiosyn-
cratic fundamental as well as strategic information on the behaviour of other
depositors of the same bank. For the sake of simplicity, we shall denote this
coordination game between depositors, as  A;t=1and  B;t=1 for bank A and B
respectively. Furthermore, in the spirit of dynamic Bayesian games, nature picks
up at random the rst movers of the game. We will assume that depositors in
bank A move rst and depositors in bank B move second. The latter deposi-
tors observe a public information encapsulating the event in bank A. Depositors
are Bayesian agents. Due to incomplete information of the game structure (de-
positors in bank B do not know whether those in bank A do not observe the
common fundamental), we assume that they use the public information about
bank A as a strategic learning tool to update their beliefs about the state of the
common macroeconomic fundamental. Along the equilibrium path, each group
of depositors plays a best-response action. Those in the second bank play a best
7See Additional Notesection F.1 after bibliography
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response after observing their private signals about their own banks fundamen-
tals and the event in the rst bank. The event in the rst bank actually leads
them to update their prior beliefs about the state of the common macroeco-
nomic fundamental so that their bank may face a similar fate as the rst bank.
It is the purpose of this paper to distill between the contagious element and the
correlated element in this banking crisis transmission process.
We are able to establish the existence of a trigger equilibrium in each banks
idiosyncratic fundamental (which is dependent on the common macroeconomic
fundamental state) and establish a connection between it and the perfect bayesian
equilibrium. The intrinsic features of the model enable us to go further and char-
acterise the properties of nancial contagion. There are two main states of the
world: tranquilstate and non-tranquilstate. The former state is one of au-
tarkyi.e a state in which banks do not trade(depositors of the second bank
do not observe the event in the rst bank). The payo¤s of depositors of either
bank are not linked in that state and the equilibrium triggers in each bank are
independent of each other. The non-tranquilstate is one which the event in the
rst bank is observed and becomes public knowledge. This creates an avenue
for a cross-bank linkage by the Bayesian updating process. Upon observing this
event (which may be either a success or a failure), depositors of the second bank
re-interpret the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental by updating
their priors of the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental. The trig-
ger equilibrium of the second bank is adjusted such that it is more likely to
su¤er from the same fate as the rst.
Being positively linked to the common fundamental, this co-movement in
bank performance consists of two parts: one part that is exclusively due to the
facts that banks are naturally positively linked (correlated) and that part which
is exclusively due to depositors changing their behaviour exclusively upon ob-
serving the event in the rst bank. The latter is what we describe as contagion.
It is characterised by dis-continuities in the transmission mechanism8 and it
is similar to the idea of an endogenous state-contingent change in cross-bank
correlation. There is a positive range of the idiosyncratic fundamental in which
the second bank fails (succeeds) if and only if the rst bank has failed (suc-
ceeded). We characterise the occurence of events across banks as a function
of the informational attributes of depositors. In particular, we can show that,
for contagion to occur in equilibrium, bank B depositors must face public in-
formational dominance i.e they attach greater importance to the public event
in bank A rather than to their own private information. Instances in which
bank B successfully resists a contagious ow from bank A, are those in which
there is private informational dominance. Here, the private information of bank
B depositors is given more attention than the public event they observe about
bank A. Bank Bs performance thus depends relatively more on its idiosyncratic
fundamentals.
8See Note G after the references section
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Our theoretical modelling structure provides a robust account of contagion
which, while meticulous and articulate in its conceptual denition, yields results
and predictions that corroborate with empirical evidence and that are capable
of explaining key stylized facts. Prior to the East Asian nancial turmoil of
1997, there was little analysis of why country-specic crises could spread in-
ternationally. The Asian crisis of 1997 appeared with its conundrum: Why
was South Korea, a member of OECD and boasting of strong economic funda-
mentals, infectedby what was happening elsewhere in the region ? Why was
Taiwan relatively less a¤ected than Malaysia ? How could the Asian turmoil
have possibly spilled over to Russia ? How could the Russian souvereign debt
default a¤ect Brazil, despite the lack of trade and nancial ows between the
two countries ?
How each of these events occur, can be explained by our setup. We docu-
ment some applications of the results of our model in Section 7. The rest of
the paper is organised as follows: Section 2 introduces the model in details.
Sections 3 and 4 explicate the underlying signal structure and the underlying
dynamic bayesian game. Section 5 explains the strategy proles and introduce
game theoretic aspects dealt with in the paper . Sections 6 and 7 characterise
the trigger equilibrium as a perfect bayesian equilibrium of the game. Section
8 describes nancial contagion and makes the fundamental distinction between
contagion and correlation as equilibrium phenomena. Section 9 discusses some
practical relevance of our paper and throws some light on policy recommenda-
tions. Section 10 concludes. A special explanatory note follows the conclusion.
All technical proofs and graphical analysis used throughout this paper, are in
the appendix.
2 The Model
The economy is divided into two ex-ante identical regions, A and B. The re-
gional structure can be a spatial metaphor. There are three periods, t = 0; 1; 2:
Each region contains one commercial bank which accepts deposits of money
from consumers and invest the proceedings in di¤erent technologies. There is a
continuum of risk-neutral consumers having strictly increasing and linear pref-
erence functions, and, being depositors in the bank of their region. As in the
literature of bank runs, the set of depositors can be represented by a unit inter-
val [0; 1], with measure equal to one and the fraction of agents in any subset can
be represented by its Lebesgue measure. Each agent lives for three periods only
and is endowed with one unit of a homogeneous good at t = 0 and deposits his
endowment in the bank of his region at t = 0. The alternative to investing in the
bank, would be, for each depositor, to costlessly invest in some external storage
technology, that yields a return of 1 at time t + 1 unit for each unit deposited
at time t. We assume that there is no Central Bank and no nancial markets
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in the model and that only banks have a comparative advantage in providing
liquidity.
2.1 Returns Stucture and Banks Investment Technologies
Each bank can either invest in a safe-and-liquid technology or in a risky-and-
illiquid technology. One unit deposited at t yields exactly one unit at t +
1 under the safe-and-liquid technology. This technology could represent cash
reserves that the banks have to keep, by statutory liquidity requirements, to
meet demand for early withdrawals9 . The risky-and-illiquid technology could
be viewed as a hedge fund and its returns structure is more extricate: We
assume that the hedge fund comprises of two risky portfolios and each bank
invests in one of the risky portfolios. The returns of each portfolio in the hedge
fund, will be assumed to be positively related. More specically, the portfolio
of bank i yields a return of ~Ri in period t = 2; where i is regarded as the
idiosyncratic fundamental of bank i: Thus, for banks A and B, returns ~RA and
~RB will be realised in period t = 2 under their risky technologies, and ~RA and
~RB , will be assumed to be positively linked to some exogenous macroeconomic
fundamental, u. Each banks risky investment technology is divisible and can
be liquidated in the interim period to meet, say, the excess demand for early
withdrawals. We assume that , if bank i liquidates its portfolio in period t = 1; it
obtains an exogenous return of r (< 1) from the liquidated portfolio 10- meaning
that there are costs to early liquidation. Furthermore, for bank i; the returns
from the risky portfolio of the hedge fund, can be 0; Rmax; ~Ri;depending on the
relationship between model parameters. This is nicely summed up in Table 1:
Table 1: Return Structure of the Risky-and-Illiquid Investment
Portfolio for Bank i
If investment is liquidated prematurely
r < 1 at time t = 1
If investment is carried on till time t = 2
~Ri =
8<:
Rmax if i > u + zi
~R(i; u) u  i  u + zi
0 i < u
9=;
9Thus, the banking system we are referring to here is a fractional reserve system.
10Thus, our emphasis on the positive link between ~RA and ~RB , holds in period t = 2 only.
If bank A prematurely liquidates its portfolio and earns r, this does not mean that bank B
will have to liquidate its asset in the hedge fund as well.
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where 0 < ~Ri < Rmax
Interpretation:
Let j = fG;Badg denote fGood State; Bad Stateg and i = fA;Bg denote
fBank A, Bank Bg :
(a) We distinguish between two fundamentals that are relevant for our analy-
sis: each bank s idiosyncratic fundamental and a macroeconomic fundamental
that is common to both banks. Parameter i simply denotes bank is idiosyn-
cratic fundamental. We assume that it is drawn randomly from some uniform
density on a unit interval. Each depositor in bank i can only noisily observe i
but the underlying probability distribution supporting i is common knowledge
to all depositors. We also make the important assumption that, once a value
for i is realised at t = 0, it does not change throughout the whole experiment.
We return to a more formal analysis of each banks idiosyncratic fundamental
in section 3.1.
(b) Parameter u represents the state of some macroeconomic fundamental
that a¤ects each bank: It is independent of a banks idiosyncratic fundamental,
i. The two distinguishing features of u are as follows: (i) It represents either
a Good (denoted G) or Bad (denoted Bad) macroeconomic state that a¤ects
each bank . If a particular state of the world occurs, it a¤ects both banks in the
same way. For e.g, if the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental is
bad, it will be so for both banks. The exact realisation of the state of the com-
mon macroeconomic fundamental is not observed by depositors but the (prior)
probability distribution underlying the binary states is common knowledge. For
simplicity, we assume that P (uBad) = 1   P (uG) = k; with uBad > uG: The
common macroeconomic fundamental is realised at t = 0 and we assume that
its realisation (which is never observed) remains stationary throughout the ex-
periment11 ;(ii) Because of the assumption enshrined in (b) (i), it follows that
there is an implicit positive linkage between the returns of ~RA and ~RB ;in that,
both ~RA and ~RB ; move in the same direction with the common fundamental.
(c) Parameter z denotes the loss caused by premature early withdrawals of
deposits from the bank, where the proportion of early withdrawals by patient
depositors is denoted by i, 0  i  1: The greater z is, the greater the disrup-
tion caused and the greater is the likelihood that u + zi is high relative to the
particular realisation of i for bank i. Note that, by adopting the specication as
in Table 1, one can see that, for extreme values of the idiosyncratic fundamental
i;the returns to the long asset depend exclusively on the value of the idiosyn-
cratic fundamental i: Before moving further, we make the following structural
assumptions about parameter values: [a:1] uG > 0; [a:2] uBad + z < 1; [a:3]
11The state of the common fundamental can never shift between good and bad throughout
our experiment.
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uBad < uG + z; [a:4] P (uBad) = 1   P (uG) = k; [a:5] P (uBad) > P (uG) with
uBad > uG:
2.1.1 Dominance Regions
Dene a worst casescenario as one in which the state of the common macro-
economic fundamental is bad (uBad) and everybody withdraws money from the
bank ( = 1); if i is high enough that it exceeds {uBad + zg; then Table 1 sug-
gests that the returns to the investment project should be Rmax: This suggests
that even in the worst case scenario when every depositor withdraws prema-
turely, i is strong enough to be dominant ( i.e determines long term returns.)
In the best case scenario (i.e one in which the state of the common funda-
mental is good (uG) and nobody withdraws prematurely (i.e i = 0), the risky
project for bank i may still fail if the value of i is so low that it lies below
uG: These case scenarios depict an important result for the returns structure
of the risky-and-illiquid technology: Regions

i : [i > u
Bad + z] [ [ < uG]	
depict those segments of the    space for which i is strictly dominant i.e can
always ruin or save the risky project and become the overriding determinant of
the risky technology. The intermediate region

i : u
G  i  uBad + z
	
rules
out any possibility of i dominance and an interraction between di¤erent model
parameters will determine the outcome of the project. This is represented by
gure 1:
Figure 1: Segregation of the i space into Strict and Weak domi-
nance regions12
(Insert Figure 1 here from Graphical Appendix )
Given assumptions [a:1]  [a:5] above, we summarise the following features
of ~Ri for any bank i: [a] 8 i < uG; ~Ri = 0; [b] 8 i > uBad + z; ~Ri =
Rmax; [c] 8 i s.t fu  i  u+ zg ; where either states of u may be realised, ~Ri
has the following properties: [c:1] For xed i; ~Ri decreases with the common
fundamental getting into its bad state (see gure 2(b) in the Appendix) - what
this is saying is that, for some bank i, moving from a good state (uG) to a bad
one (uBad) will lower returns, other factors remaining xed ; [c:2] for a xed
realisation of the common macroeconomic fundamental, ~Ri increases with i
in the relevant range of fundamentals being considered (see gure 2(a) in the
12Di¤erent papers in the literature have emphasised this tripartite classication. See for
example, Morris and Shin (1998), Goldstein and Pauzner (2005), Dasgupta (2004). Read
Section H in the Additional Notessection for more elaboration on the notions of Strict and
Weak Dominance regions.
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Appendix); [c:3] for xed i and xed state of the common fundamental, ~Ri
rotates downwards with z (see gure 2(c ) in the Appendix); [c:4] for xed i;
a decrease in the proportion of early withdrawals by depositors, i; will rotate
~Ri upwards (see explanation on gure 2 (d) in the Appendix); [c:5] for a given
state of the common macroeconomic fundamental , as i ! 0; ~Ri ! 0 i¤ i ! u
; as i ! 1; ~Ri ! Rmax i¤ i ! u + z . Figures 2 (a)-(d ) in the Appendix,
show the relationship between the returns structure of bank is risky portfolio
and di¤erent fundamentals..
Figure 2: The Relationship between Idiosyncratic Fundamental,
Common Macroeconomic Fundamental and (Risky) Returns Tech-
nology for a Typical Bank
(Insert Figures 2(a), 2(b), 2(c ) and 2(d) here from Appendix )
2.2 Payo¤ structure to depositors in each bank
As in all models of bank runs, we assume that depositors in each bank face
liquidity preference shocks i.e each of the depositors can consume early ( i.e at
t = 1) with probability  and late ( i.e at t = 2) with probability 1 : There is
a privately observed uninsurable risk of being patient or impatient, with there
being no aggregate liquidity uncertainty in the economy. The probability dis-
tribution of liquidity preference shocks is assumed to be common knowledge.
Ex-ante, each depositor has an equal and independent chance of being of impa-
tient type. Thus, for each bank, the proportion of impatient depositors is  and
the proportion of patient depositors is 1   : It is at the beginning of period
t = 1 that depositors learn their type.
In return for accepting depositorsmoney endowments, each bank o¤ers de-
mand deposit contracts to depositors. There are two states of the world to be
contrasted for modelling these contractual obligation payments. Before pro-
ceeding to a formal analysis of these states, lets turn to characterisation of the
banks optimal investment plan at time t = 0 under the assumption that there
is no bankruptcy. We temporarily assume that the deposit contract promises to
pay c1 to impatient depositors and a stochastic amount c2 to patient depositors.
12
We also assume that by adopting this term structure of demand deposit pay-
ments, the bank implicitly satises the participation constraints of depositors
and induces them to invest their endowments in period t = 0 in the bank rather
than in some external storage technology. Each bank has an asset portfolio com-
prising a fraction of y being earmarked to its short-and-liquid asset and x to
its long-and-illiquid asset. The portfolio satises the constraint that x+ y = 1:
While depositors face uncertainty ex-ante about their liquidity needs, banks do
not face such uncertainty. The liquidity needs for depositors are mutualised, so
that, by the law of large numbers, the banks can reasonably expect a fraction
 of depositors to withdraw early and a fraction 1   to withdraw late. Thus,
each bank chooses its portfolio plan such that, in period t = 1, c1 = y: Absent
bank runs, the amount paid to impatient depositors must satisfy the participa-
tion constraint provided by the external storage technology13 i.e c1 = 1. Due to
the resulting equivalence between  and y , each bank can earmark a fraction
 to its liquid asset and a fraction 1   to its illiquid asset14 .
What if there is not enough cash available to meet the demand for with-
drawals in period t = 1 ? In this case, the bank is compelled to liquidate its
risky asset and to divide the resulting proceeds of the liquidated asset equally
among those who have chosen to withdraw early. We consider some denitions
before engaging in formal analysis of deposit payments.
Denition 1 (Banking Crisis) The bank becomes in a state of crisis if it is
forced to liquidate its long-and-risky asset.
Denition 2 (Bankruptcy Zone) Bank i stops being a going-concern at t = 1
if and only if it is in a state of crisis as per denition 5 and if f+ i(1  )g >
f+ r(1  )g i.e if i > r :
Denition 3 (No Bankruptcy Zone) A bank that is in crisis as per deni-
tion 5, continues to be a going-concern in period t = 1 if i  r15 :
Following the previous discussion, a proportion  of depositors in bank i is
impatient. Suppose that a proportion i of the remaining patient depositors
want to withdraw at t = 1: The total demand for liquidity that bank i faces is
thus f+ i(1  )g :Where does the bank draw its supply of liquidity to meet
high early demand? It has  in the liquid technology. It may also draw upon
its illiquid technology and use the resulting proceeds to meet high demand for
early withdrawals. The total supply of liquidity is thus f+ r(1  )g 16 : If the
13Given our earlier assumption on risk neutrality, the need to provide insurance to impatient
depositors disappears.
14For the rest of the paper, we shall drop c1 and c2; and replace them directly by the
amounts that these parameters command from the banks balance sheet.
15Thus, a bank in crisis may still carry on operation provided it has enough to pay all those
who claim back their deposits.
16Technically, the amount supplied should be represented as fy + r(1  y)g
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total demand for early withdrawals exceed the available pool of assets that the
bank can make available, then the bank is technically bankrupt at t = 1: This
helps us characterise the bankruptcy threshold of the bank.
The importance of the bankruptcy threshold is that it determines the term
structure of payments allocation for depositors as well as the liquidationrule
for the risky asset. The concept of liquidity rule is self-explanatory. In the
bankruptcy zone, the whole risky asset is liquidated when patient depositors
choose to withdraw early. Thus, there are no leftovers for those who have
chosen to stay till period t = 2: In the no-bankruptcy zone, only a fraction of
the risky asset is liquidated. The remaining portion is carried forward till period
t = 2: Suppose that i > r (i.e Bankruptcy condition). Depositors who choose
to withdraw early appropriate the whole proceeds that the bank can generate
at t = 1. Each depositor gets an amount +r(1 )+i(1 ) ;with utility U
h
+r(1 )
+i(1 )
i
:
Since i > r, clearly,
+r(1 )
+i(1 ) < 1. Utility functions, being an increasing
function of payo¤s, this implies U
h
+r(1 )
+i(1 )
i
< U(1): The depositor is worse
o¤than when he received his full endowment back. Those patient depositors who
do not choose to imitate the impatient ones and who have chosen to withdraw
at t = 2, get a payo¤ of zero, with utility U(0):
Suppose now that i < r (i.e No-Bankruptcy condition). The whole measure
of depositors who claim early withdrawals get their whole endowment back, with
utility U(1). With this condition, to satisfy the demand for early withdrawals,
the proportion of illiquid assets that has to be liquidated is i(1 )r : The leftover
of illiquid assets that is carried on till t = 2 to nance the withdrawals of pa-
tient depositors is thus:
n
(1  )  i(1 )r
o
~Ri. Each of the patient depositors
shares this leftover, appropriated by the exact proportion of depositors who are
claiming this leftover. Each depositor thus gets
n
(1 )  i(1 )r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i)

with utility
U
n
(1 )  i(1 )r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i)

.
To summarise, the payo¤ structure for each depositor of bank i takes the
following form:
Demand Deposit Contract Payments in a Banking Crisis State:
Bankruptcy (i > r ) v/s Non-Bankruptcy Zone(i  r )
 For impatient depositors and the proportion of patient depositors who
choose to withdraw early:
Ut=1 =
(
U(1) i  r
U
h
+r(1 )
+i(1 )
i
i > r
)
 For the proportion of patient depositors who withdraw late:
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Ut=2 =
8<: U
n
(1 )  i(1 )r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i)

i  r
U(0) i > r
9=;
Demand Deposit Contract Payments in a Non-Banking Crisis State
 For impatient depositors,
Ut=1 = U (1)
 For patient depositors
Ut=2 = U (Ri)
Table 2 summarises the relationship between the net payo¤ to staying for a
typical depositor of bank i as a function of the two states of the world:
No Banking Crisis Banking Crisis Banking Crisis
NBC BC
 = 017   r  > r
Staying U (R) U
f(1 )  (1 )r g ~R
(1 )(1 )

U(0)
Withdrawing U (1) U(1) U
h
+r(1 )
+(1 )
i
Net Payo¤
U (R)
 U (1)
U
f(1 )  (1 )r g ~R
(1 )(1 )

 U(1)
U(0)
 U
h
+r(1 )
+(1 )
i
2.3 Structural Parameter Restrictions and Qualitative Fea-
tures of the Payo¤ Structure
(d.1) Under theBankruptcy-Condition (BC) with i > r, U
h
+r(1 )
+i(1 )
i
>
U(0): This result holds sway because of the feature that 0  +r(1 )+i(1 )  1. The
net payo¤ to staying as opposed to withdrawing is therefore negative in the BC
threshold.
(d.2) Under the No-Bankruptcy-Condition (NBC) with i  r, the re-
lationship between U
n
(1 )  i(1 )r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i)

and U(1);depends on the location of
i in the NBC segment. More precisely, there exists a 
#
0@equal to r

R 1


R r
1A ;
17No patient depositors withdraw early and no risky asset is liquidated prematurely.
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at which U
n
(1 )  i(1 )r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i)

= U(1): For 0   <
r

R 1


R r
; U
n
(1 )  i(1 )r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i)

>
U(1): Thus, it is strictly preferable to stay. For
r

R 1


R r
  < 1; U
n
(1 )  i(1 )r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i)

<
U(1): Here, it is strictly preferable to withdraw18 . The relationship between the
payo¤ to staying and payo¤ to withdrawing, can be shown as follows, in gure
4:
Figure 3: Depositor Payo¤Structure: Payo¤to staying v/s Payo¤
to withdrawing
(Insert Figures 3(a) and 3(b) here from Appendix)
3 Information Structure
3.1 Private Signal structure
As mentioned before, we assume that depositors cannot observe the idiosyncratic
fundamental of their bank and do not observe the actual realisation of the
common macroeconomic fundamental. While impatient depositors in each bank
have a dominant strategy of withdrawing in period t = 1, patient depositors face
a coordination problem in period t = 1 as regards their decision of whether to
stay or withdraw. Their decision is based on their informational endowment at
the time of acting. From now onwards, we drop the subscript i from all relevant
variables (except for i) because the analysis is same for either bank.
Each patient depositor noisily observes the idiosyncratic fundamental of his
bank, i: A depositors private signal can be viewed as his private heterogeneous
18Here is the proof: Since U [:] is linear and strictly increasing, condition
Ui
"n
(1 )  i(1 )
r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i)
#
= Ui(1) implies that
n
(1 )  i(1 )
r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i) = 1: Making i subject of
formula, will lead to the following: # =
r

R 1


R r
: Since Ui
"n
(1 )  i(1 )
r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i)
#
is decreas-
ing in i; it follows that for i < #; Ui
"n
(1 )  i(1 )
r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i)
#
> Ui(1): A similar analysis
will show that Ui
"n
(1 )  i(1 )
r
o
~Ri
(1 )(1 i)
#
< Ui(1) if i > #
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information available to him regarding his opinion about the long term viability
of the banks investment project. We motivate the construction of the signal
space by focusing on that part of the space that allows for strategic interraction
among depositors i.e each agent receives a signal s that forms part of interval
[sL; sU ]; where sL denotes the lower bound of the signal space and sU denotes
the upper bound19 . The point behind such formalisation is that it enables us
di¤erentiate between the segment of idiosyncratic fundamental in which the
behaviour of depositors can be anticipated for sure and the part that allows for
strategic interraction between depositors.
Each agents signal s is assumed to be independent and identically distrib-
uted, conditional on i: Thus, s denotes the type of the depositor . To keep the
analysis simple bearing in mind the above features, for bank i; we shall model
the relationship between s and i as follows: s = i + " where " denotes the
noise technology. We assume that the noise technology is common knowledge
and is uniformly distributed on a closed interval [ ";+"]: Each element of " is
independent of i and of other disturbance elements. Let sL denote the signal
that corresponds to uG   " and let sU correspond to uBad + z + ": There ex-
ists a tripartite classication of the s   space ( i.e the signal space) such that
s 2 fs : suntable [ smod erate [ sstableg where suntable =

s : 0 < s < uG   "	 ;
smod erate = fs : uG   "  s  uBad + z + "g; sstable =

uBad + z + " < s < 1
	
:
The interpretation of that tripartite classication is self-explanatory: suntable =
s : 0 < s < uG   "	 denotes the (unstable) region in which the depositors of
a given bank always withdraw, no matter what others of the same bank do;
sstable =

uBad + z + " < s < 1
	
denotes the (stable) region in which the de-
positors always stays. smod erate = fs : uG   "  s  uBad + z + "g denotes the
middle ground, at which the bank is sound but is vulnerable to a large attack
that triggers a regime change. Because of uniform distribution of i and of "; it
turns out that the an idiosyncratic fundamental in the range, 0 < i < uG 2"; is
a guarantee that all agents receive signals in the suntable =

s : 0 < s < uG   "	
zone. Similarly, a fundamental in the range uBad+ z+2" < i < 1; is a guaran-
tee that all agents receive signals in the sstable =

uBad + z + " < s < 1
	
zone.
We make the following remarks20 about the choice of s in the signal range:
Remark 1: (No-Dominance signal segment) Attention will be restricted
to the segment of the signal space in which there is strategic interraction (i.e
Dominance is ruled out). This means that s lies in interval [sL;sU ] ; where
sL  uG   " and sU  uBad + z + ".
Remark 2: (Uniformity of Prior and Posterior distribution)While
the prior distribution of the idiosyncratic fundamental is common knowledge
and follows the uniform distribution law, the posterior distribution of the idio-
19Formally, let  denote the set of all lower bound ; where  =

uG; uBad
	
: Since
uBad > uG; the greatest lower bound is the realisation of  that corresponds to state uG:
Similarly, we dene 0 as the set of upper bound ; where 0 = fuG + z; uBad + zg: Since
uBad + z > uG + z; the greatest upper bound is the realisation of  relating to uBad + z:
20These follow from Morris and Shin (1998). We adapt them in the context of our model
here
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syncratic fundamental, through specic restrictions on the degree of precision
of the signals, will also follow the uniform distribution law. The necessary and
su¢ cient condition for that restriction on the noise structure is: 2" < uG:
Proof: In Appendix (Technical)
It is important to note that, in our framework, it is impossible for depositors
of a given bank to meet, share their information and learn the true value of i
through the Law of Large Numbers (LLN).
3.2 Public Information Structure
Dene  i;t=1; i = fA;Bg ; as the stage game for withdrawal decision by patient
depositors of bank i in period t = 1: For patient depositors acting in  B;t=1, in
addition to their private signal sB about their banks idiosyncratic fundamental
B , they observe a (non-empty) set of (historical) events that have taken place in
 A;t=1. Let 
A be the space of events in bank A21 .The event 
A = fSA; FAg 
fSuccess of Bank A, Failure of Bank Ag is commonly observed by all depositors
who act in  B;t=1 and forms part of their informational endowment. Some
qualitative features of the public signal include:
(1) The public event in the rst bank can be used as a learning mechanism
by depositors in  B;t=1to update beliefs about the state of the common macro-
economic fundamental. Since the game structure is assumed not to be common
knowledge, depositors in  B;t=1are assumed not to know whether those who act
in  A;t=1 observe the realisation of the common macroeconomic fundamental.
This informational deciency creates a natural leeway for making stochastic
inferences on the posterior state of the macroeconomic fundamental.
(2) All depositors in  B;t=1observe the public signal independently of each
other. The public signal is identical for all depositors in bank B and confers the
same qualitative information about the event that has taken place in bank A.
(3) The event space, 
A = fSA; FAg; provides information to those depos-
itors playing in  B;t=1 of the actions of depositors in  A;t=1: Since events in
bank A are triggered essentially as a coordinated response by depositors who
act in  A;t=1, these events are informative of the (coordinated) actions of depos-
itors in  A;t=1: Hence events communicate (coordinated) actions in our set-up.
If bank A fails (FA is observed), then it is clear to successors that all patient
depositors in  A;t=1have chosen to withdraw (W ) early rather than Stay (S).
Subsequently, the private signals for each depositor in  A;t=1 and  B;t=1
characterise the incompleteness of information within each coordination game,
21Technically, 
A comprises a (non-empty)set of k events, where k = f1; ::::::::::; ng, with
each event denoted as k: We assume that the folllowing properties hold: P ([nk=1k) = 1
and P (\nk=1k) = 0 i.e the events are mutually exclusive and collectively exhaustive. In
our setting, the events spanning  A;t=1 can be either a Success (SA) or Failure (FA). Thus,
k = 2 and 
A = f1;2g; with 1 = SA and 2 = FA:
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 A;t=1 and  B;t=1 respectively. Beliefs that each depositor has about the idio-
syncratic fundamental of his own bank are driven essentially by his private
signal. Even though events communicate actions of predecessors, they do not
tell anything about what caused such actions. For depositors playing in  A;t=1;
only the prior belief about that fundamental is taken into account (in addition
to their private signals) to compute the expected net payo¤s of staying. The
event in bank A may be driven by realisations of A or by the state of the
common fundamental going from one state to another.
A is specic to bank A and is not observed by those playing in  B;t=1: The
only other relevant variable that may have caused the event in bank A and that
will a¤ect the payo¤s of depositors playing in  B;t=1 is the state of the common
macroeconomic fundamental. Upon observing 
A, depositors in  B;t=1 will use
this extra information strategically to form a re-assessement of the probability
distribution of the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental. Thus,
one of the possible reasons for depositors in  B;t=1 to rationally update their
prior beliefs of the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental is that, this
fundamental is the only variable that is relevant for bank A and that also a¤ects
their payo¤s. While our modelling structure achieves the task of keeping payo¤s
across banks separate, the bayesian reassessment of macroeconomic fundamental
priors by depositors of bank B, provides a legitimate informational spillover
channel that a¤ects the behaviour of depositors playing in  B;t=1: We assume
that all depositors in  B;t=1update their beliefs in the same way.
4 Taxonomy of the Dynamic Bayesian Game
Armed with the conceptual pillars we have developed in the previous subsec-
tions, we are now ready to provide an illuminating synopsis of the sequential
game that is being played between depositors of the 2 banks. Some additional
assumptions follow the discussion.
An important part of the sequential game with incomplete information is
who determines the rst-mover of the game Since both banks are otherwise
completely identical to each other, it makes no di¤erence as to which bank shall
move rst. In line with good economic theory and not to abuse the literature
of sequential move games with incomplete information, we shall be assuming
that nature chooses at random and, with equal probability, the rst mover of
the game. Lets assume that depositors in bank A are chosen to act rst22 .
22Given the features of the payo¤ structure of each bank and the assumption of complete
homogeneity, it does not matter as to which banks depositors move rst. For ease of expo-
sition, we simple label the rst-mover bank as bank A and the second-mover bank as bank
B. Issues like First-Mover Advantagesare not present in our set-up. They could be present,
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Table 3 - The Dynamic Bayesian Game
 Period 0
- Each agent invests in the bank of his region
- Each bank chooses its optimal portfolio and invests its depositorsendow-
ment in either a safe-and-liquid technology or risky-and-illiquid technology
- Realisations of the idiosyncratic fundamental i , or of the common macro-
economic fundamental occur (not observed by depositors)
- Which group of depositors will be called upon to act rst becomes publicly
known (say, Bank A)
 Period 1
- Impatient depositors of banks A and B have a dominant strategy of with-
drawing early.
- ( A;t=1) Each patient depositor in bank A receives noisy information about
his banks idiosyncratic fundamental, A
- Those patient depositors who demand early payment are paid, contingent
on there being su¢ cient cash available to meet withdrawals demands.
- The event in bank A becomes public knowledge and is commonly observed
by depositors of bank B
- ( B;t=1) Each patient depositor in bank B receives a private signal about
bank Bs idiosyncratic fundamental, B :
- Those patient depositors who demand early payment are paid, contingent
on there being su¢ cient cash available to meet withdrawals demands.
Period 2
-Risky-and-illiquid investment technology returms are realised, if not liqui-
dates in period t = 1
-Those depositors in each bank who have chosen to stay rather than withdraw
from their banks get their due back.
With homogeneity in the structural features of banks and in their operating
environment, the only parameter that links the payo¤s for each stage game is
change in perceptions of the common macroeconomic fundamental. By assum-
ing that payo¤s of depositors across banks are unrelated, our setup enables us
to focus on how the ow of information a¤ects the dynamics of coordination in
each bank, based on the changes in the perceptions about the common macro-
economic fundamental. We depart from Allen and Gale (2000) and Dasgupta
(2004) by abstracting any other form of direct linkages represented, say, by an
overlapping network of nancial contracts in the payo¤ structure of banks. In
a richer model with regional liquidity shocks and the existence of some form of
contingency plan provided by the interbank market, such form of direct link in
the payo¤ structure would have existed.
though, in models in which the banks are directly connected to each other through the inter-
bank market ( in deposits or loans). In this case, regional liquidity shocks would mean that
one bank is a debtor and the other bank is a creditor at a given period of time. See Dasgupta
(2004) for more.
20
5 Equilibrium characterisation
We start this sub-section by allowing the strategy proles in the coordination
games,  A;t=1and  B;t=1 to take a switching form; the expected net payo¤
structure to staying for the marginal depositorin each bank is then explicated.
The Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) is dened and formally related to our
model. One interesting result is that the PBE satises the trigger equilibrium.
That simplies the analysis greatly and enables us to focus on trigger equilibrium
when it comes to explicating the model results.
5.1 Strategy Proles
First-mover depositors ( i.e depositors in bank A ) do not observe a history of
past events, when they are called upon (randomly by nature) to move in  A;t=1:
Their informational endowment when they act in  A;t=1;thus consists of their
private signal (which denotes their type), the prior probability distribution of
the state of the macroeconomic fundamental and the history set depicting the
set of action proles by predecessors, which in this case, is equal to the null
set. Formally, let At=1denote the informational endowment of a typical pa-
tient depositor in bank A at  A;t=1: Then, conditional on playing in  A;t=1;
At=1 = fsA; ; H A;t=1g23 : So, for each depositor acting in  A;t=1;the equilib-
rium strategy prole takes the following mapping:  : At=1 ! a 2 A = fW;Sg :
We will be focusing on switching strategies throughout the analysis, which we
dene as follows:
Denition 4 (Switching Strategy for depositors in  A;t=1 ) A depositor
of bank A, when acting in  A;t=1; is said to be following a switching strategy if
he changes his action prole, depending on whether the private signal he receives
is below or above a signal threshold, s. If  : At=1 ! a 2 A = fW;Sg holds
where At=1 = fsA; ; H A;t=1g, then a switching strategy will take the following
form:
(At=1) =

W if s  s
S if s > s

As mentioned in the last section, depositors playing in  B;t=1 will form
a re-assessement of the probability distribution of the state of the common
macroeconomic fundamental . The updated (posterior) probability distribution
23where sA denotes the private signal of the typical depositor about A (with all the associ-
ated features of the private signal as discussed before),  is the prior probability distribution
over the common macroeconomic states and H A;t=1 = fg denotes the history of actions for
depositors in  A;t=1
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spanning the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental is denoted as 0.
Thus, formally, if Bt=1denotes the informational endowment of depositors who
move in  B;t=1, then Bt=1 = fsB ; 0;H B;t=1g where sB denotes the private
signal on B , 0 is the (posterior) re-appraisal of the prior probabilities of the
states of the common macroeconomic fundamental andH B;t=1 is the history set
which contains the events that occurred in bank A: In a similar line of reasoning
as for depositors in  A;t=1, we argue that strategies for each depositor acting
in  B;t=1 take the following mapping:  : Bt=1 ! a 2 A = fW;Sg ; and that
all depositors follow switching strategies around some signal threshold. The
trigger strategy for those acting in  B;t=1 is dened in an analogous way to that
of depositors playing in  A;t=1, except that here, the informational attributes
of depositors are augmented in this case in order to account for updated re-
assessment of common probability distributions and inclusion of a non-empty
historical set.
Denition 5 (Switching Strategy for depositors in  B;t=1) A depositor of
bank B, when acting in  B;t=1; is said to follow a trigger strategy with the follow-
ing mapping,  : Bt=1 ! a 2 A = fW;Sg ; if his behaviour is dened as follows:
(Bt=1) =
8>><>>:
W if ( 
A = fFAg) \ ( s  s)
S if ( 
A = fSAg) \ ( s > s)
S or W if

either
 
( 
A = fSAg) \ ( s  s)
or
 
( 
A = fFAg) \ ( s > s)

9>>=>>;
where Bt=1 = fsB ; 0;H B;t=1g
This denition of switching strategy for depositors in  B;t=1 provides a
straightforward characterisation of the behaviour of these depositors. Deposi-
tors stay if they observe the public information of the success of bank A (i.e

A = fSAg) and their private signals exceed a certain threshold in their pri-
vate information space ( i.e s > s): With the reverse ordering, they will
choose to withdraw. The behaviour of depositors in  B;t=1; will be inde-
terminate otherwise. One of such possibility is the occurrence of, say, event 
( 
A = fFAg) \ ( s > s) : Here, observing the failure of bank A is likely to
bias the depositors decision towards withdrawing but a strong private signal is
likely to have the opposite e¤ect. In this case, the decision as to whether to stay
or withdraw, will depend on comparison of the expected payo¤ to staying with
the payo¤ to withdrawing.
6 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of Game
Between  A;t=1 And  B;t=1
Denition 6 ( Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium) A Perfect Bayesian Equi-
librium (PBE) in the game between  A;t=1 and  B;t=1, is an assessment of
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strategy proles for depositors of each group f : At=1 ! a 2 A = fW;Sg in
 A;t=1 and  : Bt=1 ! a 2 A = fW;Sg in  B;t=1g and a set of beliefs f; 0g
where  is the set of prior beliefs about the common fundamental and  0 is the
posterior belief such that:
(1) Given his beliefs about the common fundamental (either  or 0 ) and
after every possible history H i ;t=1; i = fA;Bg ; each depositors strategy is
rational for each of his signal (i.e is a best-response to any possible moves by
all depositors of the same bank) given that these other depositors also play this
maximising game ;
(2) With the history ofpast events occuring with positive probability, then
the beliefs system f; 0g should be optimal given the strategies of depositors of
banks A and B, namely (At=1) and (
B
t=1) respectively: This means that 
0
is derived from  using Bayes Rule.
The above formal denition of the PBE in the game between  A;t=1and
 B;t=1translates into the following criteria / requirements:
Criterion 1: (Beliefs Formation) Each depositor with the move has some
belief about the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental (represented
by some probability distribution)
Denote (u j Bt=1) as the process of of updating beliefs about the com-
mon macroeconomic fundamental from its prior state  to the posterior state
0 for each depositor in  B;t=1: For depositors in  A;t=1; there is no such up-
dating process. Since depositors in  A;t=1 move rst and their information set,
At=1contains an empty historical set, it is not hard to realise that (u j At=1)
is the same as the prior probability over states denoted as  .
Criterion 2: (Sequential Rationality) Given his beliefs about the com-
mon macroeconomic fundamental (as per criterion 1) in his information set,
each depositors strategy must maximise his payo¤s, given that other depositors
of the same bank will also play this optimising game.
This idea of rationality needs more elaboration, given the complex nature
of our payo¤ function and given that, unlike most sequential move games with
incomplete information, we do not have one individual moving at a time, but a
continuum of individuals doing so.
(The following analysis is valid for depositors of either bank, except where
otherwise stated). Each depositor playing in  i;t=1 faces a uniform posterior
belief over i, conditional on observing his private signal s: Our former assump-
tions about the signal space allow us to focus on that segment of the space that
allows for strategic interraction between depositors and to model the posterior
distribution of i , conditional on observing signal s , as  j s  Uniform[s  ";
s+ "]; "  s  1  ". Assuming that all other depositors play by the switching
strategy as highlighted in section 4.1, then the proportion of early withdrawals
can be modelled as:
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[; s] =
8<:
1  < s   "
1
2 +
(s )
2" s
   "    s + "
0  > s + "
9=;
In particular, the net payo¤ to staying for depositor in  i;t=1 can be
represented as: (; s) =
Z s+"
s "
(; [; s]) d; where (; [; s]) relates to
U
f(1 )  (1 )r g ~R]
(1 )(1 )

  U(1) if   r and U(0)   U
h
+r(1 )
+(1 )
i
if  > r
: First, we move with the characterisation of the Perfect Bayesian Equilib-
rium (PBE) of the dynamic game between  A;t=1 and  B;t=1;by starting
with the decision problem of depositor in  B;t=1: For the marginal depositor
in bank B, the payo¤ structure denoted as (; s) =
Z s+"
s "
(; (s; )) d
and the depositor observes the actions of those in bank A. He adjusts his
beliefs of the probability of the common macroeconomic fundamental from 
to 0: His expected utility to staying as opposed to withdrawing will depend
on this posterior belief 0 of the common fundamental, his posterior belief
of the idiosyncratic fundamental conditional on observing his private signal
s and the strategy of successors in the continuation game. Since the with-
drawal game ends after  B;t=1; there are no successors in this game. For-
mally, the expected utility to staying as opposed to withdrawing is modelled as:
EU [s; 0] = P
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))d + (1  P )
Z s
s "
(; (s; ))d
where  0 is the posterior belief of the common macroeconomic fundamen-
tal based on the event in bank A; P denotes some probability that bank B
succeeds, given the strategies pursued by depositors in bank A and as before,Z s+"
s
(; (s; )) d denotes the positive part of the net payo¤ to staying
and
Z s
s "
(; (s; )) d denotes the negative part. Since
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))
d =  
Z s
s "
(; (s; )) d;then EU [s; 0] can be re-written as :
EU [s; 0] = [2P   1]
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))d
The expression we give for EU [s; 0] is very intuitive. The expected util-
ity to staying for any depositor playing in  B;t=1 depends on the actions of
other depositors in  B;t=1: The associated payo¤s
Z s+"
s
(; (s; )) d andZ s
s "
(; (s; )) d; respectively depict the ex-post payo¤s to the depositor in
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 B;t=1 when all depositors stay and withdraw respectively, given their switching
strategy around s. Thus, one can see that (s; ) a¤ects the probability of
success or failure in bank B and also the expected net payo¤ to staying for an
individual depositor: (s; ) (=
Z s+"
s "
(; [; s]) d): For example, when
(s; ) is su¢ ciently high, the expected net payo¤ to staying for a marginal de-
positor, given that all other depositors are playing a switching strategy around
s, will be given by
Z s
s "
(; (s; )) d (< 0). Thus, more weight is given to
the negative element of the expected net payo¤. Conversely, for low proportion
of early withdrawals, (s; ); more weight is given to the positive element of the
expected net payo¤: to staying is positive i.e
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))d > 0: To know
exactly which value (s; ) will take, depends on the optimising strategy of de-
positors of bank B. Each depositor in  B;t=1 who receives some signal s chooses
an action that maximises his expected utility, given the optimising actions of
other depositors in the same bank: Taking into account the beliefs updating
process as well as the best reponse of other depositors, the best-response func-
tion for each depositor in  B;t=1 who receives some signal s; can be expressed
as follows:
	B(:) = maxa 2 A[2P   1]
Z s+"
s
(; (s; )) (u j Bt=1)d where the net
payo¤ function has been augmented to allow for posterior beliefs about the state
of the common fundamental.
For each depositor in  A;t=1 who receives a signal s, the payo¤ structure
can be expressed as (; s) =
Z s+"
s "
(; (s; )) d assuming that all other
depositors in bank A follow a switching strategy around s: In a way analoguous
to the analysis carried out for depositors in  B;t=1, we dene the best response
function for those in  A;t=1 as:
	A(:) = maxa 2 A[2P   1]
Z s+"
s
(; (s; )) (u j At=1)d where the net
payo¤ function has been augmented to allow for prior beliefs about the state
of the common fundamental. (As argued before, since the history set is nil,
(u j At=1) is same as prior beliefs about the state of the common fundamental
for depositors playing in  A;t=1:
Criterion 3: (Bayes Updating Process) The beliefs updating process
by depositors of bank B from the prior state of the common macroeconomic
fundamental to the posterior state is undertaken using Bayes rule.
The idea is that while depositors of bank A have some prior beliefs about
the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental, depositors in bank B use
the public information about bank A to update their beliefs about the state
of the common fundamental. As per criterion 2, they use this posterior belief
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to compute their expected payo¤s. We focus on the exact mechanics of the
updating process in the next subsection. For the moment, it just su¢ ces to
believe that, with no information set being o¤ the equilibrium path given the
equilibrium strategies of the game, any updating process that conforms with
Bayes rule will still keep us along the trajectory pathway prescribed by the
Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium concept.
We next want to show that all equilibrium proles that satisfy the PBE
concept must also be a trigger equilibrium . This will enable us simplify the
analysis of the dynamic equilibrium pathway considerably and to focus attention
on trigger equilibria throughout the whole experiment
Proposition 1: If the event in Bank A is used for Bayesian updating only,
then the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE) of the dynamic game between
 A;t=1 and  B;t=1 can be represented as a trigger equilibrium.
Proof: In Technical Appendix
7 Characterisation of Trigger Equilibrium
We have shown in the previous section that a PBE of the game between  A;t=1
and  B;t=1 can be represented as a trigger equilibrium. In this section, we show
that such a trigger equilibrium actually exists and we explore its properties in
more details.
Proposition 2(a): (Existence of a Trigger Equilibrium) In each de-
positors game, there exists a threshold s such that he withdraws if s  s and
stays if s > s
Proof: In Technical Appendix
Put simply, the expected net payo¤ to staying for the marginal depositor
who receives a signal of s (assuming that all depositors follow the trigger strat-
egy) is given by (s; ) =
Z s+"
s "
(; [; s]) d = 0 ( where (; (; s))
is dened in the proof of proposition 2(a)). Let the expected net payo¤ to
staying for any depositor who receives some signal s be given by: (s; ) =Z s+"
s "
(; [; s]) d: We have shown in proposition 2(a) that, by the assump-
tion of continuity of the net payo¤ structure in s, when s  s; (s; ) <
(s; ) = 0: The intuition is that when we integrate the payo¤ function over
the [s  "; s+ "] range, we add more to the negative element of the payo¤ and
substract a signicant part of the positive element of the payo¤. Thus, when
s  s; the overall net payo¤ to staying is negative i.e depositors will choose
to withdraw rather than stay. Similarly, when s > s; (s; ) > (s; ) = 0:
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A similar logic will show that in this case, integrating the payo¤ function over
[s  "; s+ "] range will mean adding more to the positive element and sub-
stracting the negative element of the payo¤. When s > s;the overall net payo¤
to staying is positive i.e depositors will choose to stay rather than withdraw.
This leads us to another important result which we relate to parameters of the
model:
Proposition 2(b): (Uniqueness of s) If s exists, then it is the unique
Proof: From proposition 2(a)
Following from propositions 2(a) and 2(b), it follows that depositors of either
bank stay if s > s and withdraw if s  s: The above derivations did not
specically explicate how  varies with structural changes in parameters that
characterise the returns structure of the illiquid-and-risky technology. We next
turn to the existence of  and extol on its main qualitative feature.
Proposition 3: (Existence and Features of ) Following propositions
2(a) and 2(b), there exists a threshold in each bank, above which the bank
succeeds and below which the bank fails. In addition, for either bank, the location
of  has the property that : (uBad) > (uG) with uBad > uG:
Proof: In Technical Appendix
Corollary 1: (Characterisation of Trigger {sA; 

A (u)g in  A;t=1 and
of fsB ; B (u)gin  B;t=1)
Given (At=1) ! a  A = fW;Sg and (Bt=1) ! a  A = fW;Sg for
depositors in  A;t=1and in  B;t=1 respectively, we can summarise the algorithm
that traces the equilibrium values of fsA; A (u)g and of fsB ; B (u)g as follows:
Algorithm tracing equilibrium values of sA; 

A (u) ; s

B ; 

B (u) :
For depositors in  A;t=1;
(At=1) =

W if s  s
S if s > s

and A (u) solves8>><>>:
A(; s
) = 0
and [; s] =
8<:
1  < s   "
1
2 +
( )
2" s
   "   < s + "
0   s + "
9=;
9>>=>>;
For depositors in  B;t=1;
(
B
t=1) =
8>><>>:
W if ( 
A = fFAg) \ ( s  s)
S if ( 
A = fSAg) \ ( s > s)
S or W if

either
 
( 
A = fSAg) \ ( s < s)
or
 
( 
A = fFAg) \ ( s > s))

9>>=>>;
and B (u) solves
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8>><>>:
B(; s
) = 0
and B [; s] =
8<:
1  < s   "
1
2 +
(s )
2" s
   "   < s + "
0   s + "
9=;
9>>=>>;
The derivation of the unique threshold for each bank can also be found in
other models in the literature. Dasgupta(2004) obtains similar results, albeit
with a more complex payo¤ structure. The existence of the overlapping net-
works structure of nancial contracts that tie the banks together ( through the
interbank market in deposits) can explain contagion as a unique phenomenon.
The failure of bank A means that depositors in  B;t=1;su¤er a loss of claims
due to them. As a result, their behaviour changes. Other papers in the liter-
ature do get the uniqueness result: Goldstein and Pauzner (2005) endogenise
the probability of bank runs and relate that probability to the features of the
demand-deposit contract. In their paper, as second-best solution, the optimal
contract is featured by a trade-o¤ between risk-sharing (e¢ ciency) and the en-
dogeneous probability of bank runs (instability).
The novelty of these papers is that they rationalise the case for unique
equilibrium in the coordination game facing depositors, even in the absence
of global strategic complementarities. The uniqueness result of Carlsson and
VanDamme(1993) and Morris and Shin (1998), (1999), necessarily rely on the
existence of (global) strategic complementarities/supermodularities in coordi-
nation games. Banking models are not featured by supermodularities in the
payo¤ structure - above some threshold, decisions become strategic substitutes.
Nonetheless, the innovative approach of Dasgupta(2004) and of Goldstein and
Pauzner (2005) models is that they show that through the existence of single-
crossing property in the payo¤ structure and of an error technology that satis-
es the Monotone-Likelihood Ratio Property (MLRP), a unique result can exist
even in the absence of strategic complementarities.
7.1 Mechanics of Beliefs Updating
The re-assessment of the beliefs mechanism of the state of the common macro-
economic fundamental from the prior distribution to the posterior distribution,
was constrained to some general form of bayesian updating process, without ex-
plicit reference to the intrinsic stochastic properties of the updating process. In
this section, we will add statistical structure to the updating process, elaborate
on the stochastic properties of the resulting informational generating process.
The updating process does not focus on depositorsprivate signals because each
depositor in  i;t=1 receives his private signal only once in  i;t=1and there is no
evolution of private signals over time. Furthermore, by the assumption that
2"  min [uG; 1 uG z] of remarks 1 and 2 above; each depositor has a private
signal which is of minimal precision.
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The updating mechanism concerns only parameter u. The actual realisation
of u is not apriori known to depositors in  A;t=1 and  B;t=1 : But upon observ-
ing the public event in bank A, depositors in  B;t=1 have an extra information
on the state of the common fundamental u , which we shall dub the learning
mechanism. Since they do not observe what is triggering the event in bank
A, they face a statistical inference problem. Any revised version of the state
u, conditional upon observing the event in bank A, constitutes this learning
process.
To keep the model analytically tractable, we shall place a few restrictions
on the apriori distribution. As a reminder, P (uBad) = k and P (uG) = 1   k
and  is the space that contains this prior probability distribution. Dene
the partitioned space events, SA and FA as follows: SA : fA > A (u)g and
FA : fA  A (u)g. Since A is uniformly distributed on [0; 1]; it follows that
Prob(A > 

A (u)) = 1 A (u) and that Prob(A  A(u)) = A(u) . With the
property that, uBad > uG; we know, by proposition 3, that (uBad) > (uG):
The following conditional probability assessments subsequently hold:
Pr ob(FA j u = uBad) = A(uBad)
Pr ob(FA j u = uG) = A(uG)
Pr ob(SA j u = uBad) = 1  A(uBad)
Pr ob(SA j u = uG) = 1  A(uG)
with A(u
Bad) > A(u
G) and 1   A(uBad) < 1   A(uG): In section 4.2,
we denoted (u j Bt=1) as the process of of updating beliefs about the common
macroeconomic fundamental from its prior state  to the posterior state 0 for
each depositor in  B;t=1 with informational endowment Bt=1: Here, we add
structure to the exact nature of (u j Bt=1): Using Bayes rule, we have the
following revision estimates for depositors in bank B, conditional upon observing
an event in bank A:
Pr ob(u = uBad j FA) = P (FAju=u
Bad)P (u=uBad)
P (FAju=uBad)P (u=uBad)+P (FAju=uG)P (u=uG)
=
k:A(u
Bad)
k:A(u
Bad)+(1 k)A(uG)
Similarly, Pr ob(u = uBad j SA) = P (SAju=u
Bad)P (u=uBad)
P (SAju=uBad)P (u=uBad)+P (SAju=uG)P (u=uG)
=
k:(1 A(uBad))
k:(1 A(uBad))+(1 k)(1 A(uG))
Analoguously, Prob(u = uG j SA) = 1  Pr ob(u = uBad j SA)
=
(1 k)(1 A(uG))
(1 k)(1 A(uBad)) + k(1 A(uG)) and Prob(u = u
G j FA) = 1   Pr ob(u =
uBad j FA) = (1 k)

A(u
G)
(1 k)A(uG) + kA(uBad) : This yields a proposition:
Proposition 4: (Learning Mechanism) Upon observing the failure of
bank A, the probability that the common macroeconomic fundamental was in
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its bad state is more likely than unconditionally. Thus, (1) Pr ob(u = uBad j
FA) > Pr ob(u = u
Bad) > Pr ob(u = uBad j SA) . Similarly, conditional on
observing the success of bank A, the probability that the common macroeconomic
fundamental was in its good state is more likely than unconditionally. Thus, (2)
Pr ob(u = uG j SA) > Pr ob(u = uG) > Pr ob(u = uG j FA):
Proof: In Technical Appendix.
The di¤erent possibilities of an event in bank A being associated with an
event in bank B can be represented by a set of equations that characterise
the probability of the events taking place . If we represent fFA;FB ; SA; SBg
analoguously to what we have done before in the previous section, then we may
represent the probability of a failure in bank A being associated with a failure
in bank B as follows: Pr(FB j FA) = Pr(B  B(u) j A  A(u)); where
Pr(FB j FA) denotes the probability of bank B failing, given the observed failure
of bank A. This can be represented as follows: Pr(FB j FA) = Pr(FB j fu =
uBadg\FA) Pr(fu = uBadg j FA)+ Pr(FB j fu = uGg\FA) Pr(fu = uGg j FA):
Since we know the values of Pr(fu = uBadg j FA) and Pr(fu = uGg j FA); we can
replace these values in the above expression and get a much simplied version of
Pr(FB j FA) where Pr(FB j FA) =
n
kA(u
Bad)B(u
Bad) + (1 k)A(uG)B(uG)
kA(u
Bad) + (1 k)A(uG)
o
:
Similarly, Pr(FB j SA) = Pr(B  B(u) j A > A(u)); where Pr(FB j SA)
denotes the probability that bank B fails, given that it is observed that bank
A has survived an attack before. This probability can be expressed as Pr(FB j
fu = uBadg\SA) Pr(fu = uBadg j SA)+ Pr(FB j fu = uGg\SA) Pr(fu = uGg j
SA):We can it as Pr(FB j SA) =
n
k(1 A(uBad))B(uBad)+(1 k)(1 A(uG))B(uG)
1 kA(uBad) (1 k)A(uG)
o
after appropriate substitutions. : Events Pr(SB j FA) and Pr(SB j SA) can be
derived analoguously in terms of parameters of our model. The interested reader
will nd that Pr(SB j FA) = 1  Pr(FB j FA)
= 1  
n
kA(u
Bad)B(u
Bad) + (1 k)A(uG)B(uG)
kA(u
Bad) + (1 k)A(uG)
o
and that Pr(SB j SA) = 1  
Pr(FB j SA)
= 1 
n
k(1 A(uBad))B(uBad)+(1 k)(1 A(uG))B(uG)
1 kA(uBad) (1 k)A(uG)
o
: The technical appen-
dix contains a section that summarises all conditional and unconditional prob-
ability associated with events in the two banks.
Proposition 5: The posterior estimates of the state of the common macro-
economic fundamental by depositors of bank B retain all mathematical proper-
ties of propositions 2(a), 2(b) and 3. Furthermore, observing the failure (suc-
cess) of bank A pushes the trigger of bank B upwards (downwards), such that
FAB (u) > 

B(u)

SAB (u)  B(u) respectively

: Thus, bank B now fails for
larger (smaller) realisations of its own idiosyncratic fundamentals.
Proof: In the Technical Appendix.
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8 Contagious Bank Failures and Correlated Bank
Failures
There is no one-size-ts-alldenition of nancial contagion given by the lit-
erature. The existence of a common macroeconomic fundamental in our model,
nonetheless, complicates matters. There may be multiple bank failures due to
adverse macroeconomic fundamental to which both banks are commonly ex-
posed to. But that does not necessarily mean that one bank failure is actually
causing the other. For instance, if the two banks have assets denominated in one
currency and liabilities denominated in another currency, a currency change will
a¤ect both banks together in a similar way. This common failure is merely due
to a common exposure, which exists in all states of the world, to the exchange
rate and is not what we are primarily concerned with here. In this section, we
endeavour to draw the line between instances in which a transmission of banking
failure is exclusively due to perceived deterioration of the state of the common
fundamental (correlatedness) and instances in which this transmission of failures
across banks is due to changes in behaviour of depositors in bank B exclusively
due to the observed event in bank A (contagion). We investigate whether, for
banks with common exposure, these concepts are mutually exclusive or whether
they are indissociable from each other and arise from the same source.
8.1 Financial Contagion as State-Contingent Change in
Cross-Bank Correlation
To be able to dene nancial contagion appropriately within the setup we have
adopted, it is important to stress on the cause-e¤ect relationship that underpins
the concept. Heuristically, we could view nancial contagion as an event that
occurs when the failure of bank A causes bank B to fail, when bank B would not
have failed otherwise. Note the importance of the second part of the statement
....when bank B would not have failed otherwise....... This implies that, in
our denition, without bank A, bank B could fail for other reasons (e.g its
idiosyncratic fundamental is too low) or it could possibly not fail at all. What
the statement is really saying, is that the performance of bank A, by itself,
will increase the likelihood of failure of bank B over what could possibly have
happened without the presence of bank A. Before moving on further, we must
rst elicit the conditions under which this will hold true. Then we shall formalise
the concept of contagion through appropriate use of diagrams. Consider Figure
4:
Figure 4 - Idiosyncratic Thresholds of Banks A
and B
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(Insert Figure 4 here from Graphical Appendix)
Figure 4 highlights the unique threshold in each bank. For the moment,
let us forget about the dynamics that will cause A (u) and 

B (u) to vary and
attempt to situate what we have learned in the previous topic in the above
diagram. Thus, initially, we set A (u) = 

B (u) and, with slight abuse of the
language, shall refer to this as the autarky situation24 or as in the introduction,
the tranquilstate.
Quadrants 3 and 2 show similar results in both banks. Quadrant 3 depicts
the phenomenon of both banks failing (i.e A  A (u) , B  B (u) ) while
quadrant 2 shows both banks succeeding or not failing ( i.e A > 

A (u) ,
B > 

B (u)). Quadrants 1 and 4 show mixed result. The former depicts the
success of bank B but failure of bank A ( i.e A  A (u) , B > B (u) ) while
the latter shows the reverse e¤ects ( i.e A > 

A (u) , B  B (u) ).
How would our concept of nancial contagion t into the diagram? Could we
possibly argue that contagion is an event that occurs in quadrant 3? Doing so
would merely show the joint occurrence of failures of bank A and B but there is
nothing to tell us about the causation of the crises. Any permutation of events
is possible in that quadrant. Bank B can fail for reasons other than failure of
bank A and vice versa. To get a proper representation of nancial contagion, we
abstract from what may commonly be driving the performance of both banks.
This is done by controlling for the level of the common macroeconomic funda-
mental. The aim is to assess mathematically how the failure of bank A, by itself,
can cause the failure of bank B after controlling for the common fundamental.
Thus, we must show that, whenever bank A fails ( i.e A  A (u) ), the
probability of bank B failing for a given level of macroeconomic fundamental,
will be higher than B (u): For each of the possible two realisations of the
common macroeconomic fundamental, this probability can be assessed. What
extra feature does the failure of bank A has on bank Bs threshold ? It was shown
in proposition 5 that, upon failure of bank A, the trigger of bank B is adjusted
in such a way that depositors in bank B are most likely to share a similar fate to
those of bank A. We denoted that trigger FAB (u): Assuming that the common
macroeconomic fundamental is in its bad state, the cause-e¤ect relationship
between failure of bank A and failure of bank B can be represented as events Pr
(B  B (u) j A  A (u) \ fu = uBadg). Recall that Pr(B  B(u) j A 
A (u) \ fu = uBadg)  FAB;uBad : We referred to this as the threshold for bank
B but computed with conditional probability, Pr(u = uBad j FA) which we gave
24Autarky typically refers to absence of trade but here, it means that there is no interraction
among the banks. Depositors of each bank behave as if the other bank did not exist. Due to
identical endowments and similar returns structure, it is obvious that A (u) = 

B(u ):
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earlier as k 

A(uBad)
k A(uBad) + (1 k)A(uBad) : Clearly, 
FA
B;uBad
> B (u), where 

B (u) is
computed as the threshold of bank B in the autarky case.
Similarly, we computed the event that bank B fails conditional on success of
bank A and the state of the common fundamental being bad as Pr(B  B(u) j
A > 

A (u) \ fu = uBadg)  SAB;uBad . This refers to the threshold of bank B
computed with conditional probability Pr(u = uBad j SA) which we gave earlier
as k (1 

A(uBad))
k (1 A(uBad)) + (1 k)(1 A(uG)) : Clearly, 
SA
B;uBad
 B (u); where B (u) is
computed for bank B as in the autarky case. We present the autarky thresholds
A (u) ; 

B (u); 
SA
B;uBad
and FAB;uBad in the following diagram:
Figure 5(a) - Thresholds A (uBad) ; 

B (uBad); 
SA
B;uBad
; FAB;uBad
and Financial Contagion - Assuming State of Common Macroeco-
nomic Fundamental is bad.
(Insert Figure 5(a) here from Graphical Appendix)
Figure 6 in the Appendix gives us the analoguous representation for nancial
contagion in case the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental is good.
The representations in gure 5(a) and 6 enable us formalise the denition of
nancial contagion as follows:
Denition 1: (Formal) (Financial Contagion) For the part of the game
between  A;t=1 and  B;t=1 characterised by the existence of a unique threshold
in the depositorsgame, nancial contagion is said to occur when:
For A 2

uG ; uBad + z

, B 2

uG ; uBad + z

and conditional on state
u
Either (1) eventn
f A  A (u)g \ f B(u)  B  FAB;ug
o
for a given macroeconomic state
u
The probability of contagion is a weighted average of the above event, with
each weight corresponding to the probability distribution underlying the particu-
lar state of the macroeconomic fundamental:
Pr(Contagious Failures)
= k

FAB;uBad   B(uBad)
  
A
 
uBad
  uBad+
(1  k)

FAB;uG   B(uG)
  
A
 
uG
  uG
Or (2) eventn
f A > A (u) g \ fSAB;u  B  B(u)g
o
for a given macroeconomic state
u
33
The probability of contagion is a weighted average of the above event, with
each weight corresponding to the probability distribution underlying the particu-
lar state of the macroeconomic fundamental:
P (Contagious Success)
= k

B(u
Bad)  SA
B;uBad
   
uBad + z
  A(uBad)+
(1  k)

B(u
G)  SA
B;uG
   
uG + z
  A(uG)
Notice that in gures 5(a) and 6, each form of contagion is represented by
the two shaded segments of the graphs. It is only in these two segments that we
can reasonably have a cause-e¤ect relationship. For instance, assume that the
state of the common macroeconomic fundamental is bad. We have argued that
when bank A fails, the trigger of bank B is revised upwards taking into account
the fact that bad news have raised the trigger from B(u
Bad ) to FAB;uBad : This
extra increase in the trigger due to the event in bank A is what the shaded
segment on the left of gure 5(a) is all about. Here, bad news about bank A
have altered the behaviour of depositors in bank B such that, given the level
of the common macroeconomic fundamental, bank B fails for a wider range
of its own fundamentals. The di¤erence FAB;uBad   B(uBad) represents this
cause-e¤ect relationship.
Point M in gure 5(a) shows a case where failure of bank A can cause bank
B to fail. Without interractions between the two banks, point M would have
represented an outcome such that depositors of bank A would have chosen to re-
main invested, given the strategies they pursue. The possibility of interractions
between banks means that the failure of bank A leads to an updated assessment
of the prior states of the common fundamental by depositors of bank B such
that the threshold of bank B is raised relative to the autarkic level. Point M
thus represents a case of B being less than the new threshold 
FA
B;uBad
: Thus
depositors in bank B withdraw when they would not have done so otherwise.
Like point M, any point within the left shaded area of gure 5(a), represents
a case of success of bank B in autarky case but failure with interraction case.
Notice that points below the horizontal (dotted) line B
 
uBad

represent failure
of bank B, even though bank A does not exist. Point N, thus cannot represent
nancial contagion because even though both banks A and B fail, bank B would
have failed anyway even without bank As presence.
In the same token, success of bank A will lower the trigger of bank B from
B
 
uBad

to SAB;uBad assuming that the common macroeconomic fundamental
is in its bad state. That extra fall in the trigger of bank B due to the event of
bank A also depicts nancial contagion (shown as the right hand shaded segment
of gure 5(a)). Ostensibly, the arguments also run through if the common
fundamental was in the good state ( i.e u = uG ). Without interraction, point
P would have represented a case of bank B failure in the autarkic case. Allowing
for interraction between banks leads to an updated assessment of the prior states
of the common fundamental such that the new trigger becomes SAB;uG : Point P
represents a case of bank failure without interraction but a case of no bank
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failure with interraction. Like point P, any point in the shaded area on the
right of gure 5(a) represents a case of success of bank B exclusively due to
success of bank A.
Denition 2: (Informal) (Financial Contagion) Signicant change in
the co-movements of events across banks, conditional on an event occurring in
the rst bank.
This concept of contagion is highly appealling and largely ts what is com-
monly perceived as a by-product of natural correlation: that the intensity of the
transmission mechanism channel is di¤erent after a shock plaguing one bank.
In all states of the world, the two banks are correlated but in the non-tranquil
state, there is an extra element to this transmission mechanism that appears in
the form of excessive correlatedness. This refers to investors of the second bank
changing their behaviour just because of the event in the rst bank and is what
constitutes contagion in our paper. By stressing on the quantitative element (
i.e signicant change), it conveys the notion of contagion as representing ex-
cessive co-movements, relative to some normal benchmark. The purpose of this
section was to dene this normalyardstick and to contrast the excesswith
respect to it.
Quadrants 3 and 2 depict natural correlated performance.
Denition 3: (Formal) (Financial Correlation) For the game between
 A;t=1 and  B;t=1 characterised by the existence of a threshold equilibrium in
the depositorsgame, nancial correlation is said to occur when:
For A 2

uG ; uBad + z

, B 2

uG ; uBad + z

and conditional on state
u
Either(1) Negative Correlatedness
ffu  A  A (u)g \ f u  B  B(u)gg for a given macroeconomic state
u
The probability of negative correlatedness is a weighted average of the above
event, with each weight corresponding to the probability of a particular state of
the macroeconomic fundamental occurring:
P (Correlated Failures)
= k
 
B(u
Bad)  uBad   A  uBad  uBad+
(1  k)  B(uG)  uG  A(uG)  uG
Or (2) Positive Correlatedness
ff (u+ z) > A > A (u) g \ fB(u)  B  (u+ z)g gfor a given macro-
economic state u
The probability of postive correlatedness is a weighted average of the above
event, with each weight corresponding to the probability of a particular state of
the macroeconomic fundamental occurring:
P (Positive Correlatedness)
= k
  
uBad + z
  B(uBad)   uBad + z  A  uBad+
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(1  k)   uG + z  B(uG)   uG + z  A  uG
The presence of common exposure to the macroeconomic fundamental means
that the performance of bank A and bank B will inexorably be driven by common
factors and will follow the same cycle in all states of the world . With contagion
being depicted as a case of an excess in this natural correlation, we next turn on
to rationalising the case for contagion as a function of informational attributes
of depositors.
8.1.1 Public Informational Dominance vs Private Informational
Dominance
What constitutes the driving force behind the crucial di¤erence between con-
tagion and correlation ? Intuitively, the di¤erence in the results obtained can
be attributed to the relative importance of information in depositorsstrategy.
We know that, by construction, the banks have a correlated performance in
all states of the world. Thus, a boom in the performance of portfolios in the
hedge fund will drive their performance sky-high and a recession will result in
a lacklustre performance. The shaded rectangles in gure 5(a) in the graphical
appendix represent cases of excess correlation. The location of a given point
reects the location of the idiosyncratic fundamental of each bank. With precise
private signals, the location of point M also signies the relative importance of
private signals in depositors strategy. Consider point M for instance. From
the perspective of bank A, M suggests that A  A (u) : Given their strategy,
depositors of bank A will withdraw and, by proposition 3, bank A fails since the
set of signals that depositors receive will cluster around A . From the perspec-
tive of bank B, point M suggests that a success of bank B in the autarky case
but a failure in the case in which depositors are allowed to observe the event in
bank A. The location of B at point M relative to the autarky case, reects the
location of private signals of depositors of bank B. Thus, the (vertical) distance
of between the B at point M and the autarkic threshold 

B (u) denotes the
importance of private signals in depositorsstrategy. Observing the failure of
bank A leads all depositors of bank B to update their beliefs about the state
of the common macroeconomic fundamental, such that the threshold of bank B
increases from B (u) to 
FA
B (u) : The distance 
FA
B (u)   B (u) represents the
increased probability of failure of bank B exclusively due to the observed public
event in bank A. Thus, the distance FAB (u)  B (u) represents the importance
of public signals in depositorsstrategy.
The classication of an event as correlation, contagion or neither of these
depends on the relative importance of private and public signals in bank B
depositorsdecision set. Point M, for instance, is a point at which the relative
importance of the private information is less than the relative importance of the
public infomation. We thus have public informational dominance here. Any
point in the shaded area is characterised by public informational dominance.
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When this happens, an event in bank A will always contagiously spread to bank
B with the denition of contagion we adopted earlier. Point P, associated with
a success of bank A, is also characterised by public informational dominance
by virtue of the same features characterising the informational attributes in
depositorsdecisions (as in point M).
Point O, characterised by failure of bank A, is one in which the vertical
location of B relative to the autarkic threshold 

B (u) ; exceeds the vertical
distance FAB (u)   B (u) : When this takes place, the private signals of depos-
itors of bank B are given relatively more importance than the public signal
emanating from the observed event in bank A. This is dubbed private informa-
tional dominance. Any point in the quadrant that is north of the shaded area
containing point M, is characterised by private informational dominance. Here,
intuitively, the depositors of bank B attach more importance to their private
signals (which are high because they are clustered around a high B) than to
the publicly observed event. Thus, a strong idiosyncratic performance of bank
B may ward o¤ any informational attributes coming from a publicly observed
event such that no contagion occurs. In a similar line of thought, any point in
the quadrant south of the shaded area containing point P will be characterised
by strict private informational dominance. The intuition is that, while bank A
has succeeded (relative importance of public information for depositors of bank
B being represented by vertical distance B (u)   SAB (u)); the relative impor-
tance of private information (measured by vertical distance B (u) B) is given
more importance in the decision set of depositors of bank B. The performance of
bank B is thus driven relatively more by the private information of its depositors
in this quadrant. Thus, bank B fails.
Points in any other quadrants (e.g point N in the south-west quadrant
(A  A (u) ; B  B (u)) or point Q in the north-east quadrant (A > A (u) ; B > B (u))
represent cases of natural correlation. Here, the performances of banks are
driven by their idiosyncratic fundamentals with or without interraction. Banks
register identical results in all states of the world. There is no di¤erence be-
tween autarky and interraction cases. Bayesian updating about the state of the
common macroeconomic fundamental has no bite on the results. Figure 5 (b) in
the graphical appendix summarises the quadrants with their main informational
attributes. To sum up:
Summary 1 (Public Informational Dominance vs Private Informa-
tional Dominance) The performance space of the two banks can be segregated
into three main events for bank B: Correlation, Contagion and None.
(Correlation) Banks are naturally correlated in all states of the world due to
identical investment in a hedge fund a¤ected by some common macroeconomic
fundamental.
(Contagion) Contagion, derived as an excess in this natural correlation, oc-
curs due to public informational dominance in depositors decision set. Here,
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depositors of bank B give relatively more importance to the public news emanat-
ing from the event in bank A than to their private information, such that bank
Bs performance follows the public news and su¤ers a fate identical to that of
bank A.
(None) The case in which bank B does not share the same fate as bank A
is a case in which there is private informational dominance. Here, the private
information of depositors is so strong (upwards or downwards) that it wards o¤
completely the public event of bank As performance. Bank Bs performance is
driven more by its idiosyncratic fundamentals.
8.2 Properties of Contagion and of Correlation as Equi-
librium Phenomena
Property 1: Conditional on the state of the common macroeconomic funda-
mental being bad, the probability of having bad contagion (correlation) exceeds
that of having good contagion (correlation)
Illustration:
P(Contagious Failures) > P(Contagious Success)
FAB;uBad   B(uBad)
  
A
 
uBad
  uBad >
B(u
Bad)  SA
B;uBad
   
uBad + z
  A(uBad)
P( Correlated Failures) > P( Correlated Success) 
B(u
Bad)  uBad  A  uBad  uBad >  
uBad + z
  B(uBad)   uBad + z  A  uBad
Property 2: Conditional on the state of the common macroeconomic fun-
damental being good, the probability of good contagion (correlation) exceeds that
of bad contagion (correlation)
Illustration:
P(Contagious Success) > P(Contagious Failure)
B(u
G)  SA
B;uG
   
uG + z
  A  uG > FAB;uG   B(uG)  A  uG   uG
P(Correlated Success) > P(Correlated Failure)  
uG + z
  B(uG) ( uG + z A(uG)) >  B(uG)  uG   A  uG  uG
The relative importance of contagion v/s correlation depends on the partic-
ular values that threshold parameters take.
While properties 1 and 2 establish that we can unambiguously rank the con-
tagious failures and successes of a bank as well as the correlated failures and
successes, there is no light that transpires as to comparing contagious perfor-
mance and a correlated performance. Judging whether a multiple bank shock is
more a matter of correlation than of contagion, is entirely dependent on para-
metric values that thresholds may have. To take an example, gures 5(a) and
6 (in the Appendix) have been drawn such that correlation is relatively more
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important than contagion. We could well have illustrated an interpretation of
banking performance, using the illustration from gure 7 in the Appendix. In
this case, conditional on the macroeconomic fundamental being in its bad state,
for instance, contagious bank failures have a higher probability than correlated
bank failures (where the relative importance depends on the relative area sizes,
depicting their respective probabilities). Similar interpretations can be derived
from arbitrary constellation of gures. Figure 8 shows that, conditional on
macroeconomic fundamental being good, positive contagious probability ex-
ceeds positive correlatedness. Gauging the size of a contagious event relative to
a correlated event is of primacy importance to policymakers since contagion has
di¤erent implications for policymaking relative to correlation. We return to the
implications for policymaking in the next section.
Property 3: (Incidence of Contagion is zero due to uniform distri-
bution of fundamental and error technology)
Interpret Incidencehere as referring to Net Contagion weighted appropri-
ately by the prior probability distribution over the states of the common macro-
economic fundamental. The incidence of contagion is zero.
Proof. The incidence is given by:
k

FAB;uBad   B(uBad)
  
A
 
uBad
  uBad
 k

B(u
Bad)  SA
B;uBad
   
uBad + z
  A  uBad
+(1  k)

FA
B;uG
  B(uG)
  
A
 
uG
  uG
  (1  k)

B(u
G)  SA
B;uG
   
uG + z
  A = 0
Property 4: (Incidence of Correlation is zero due to uniform dis-
tribution of fundamental and error technology)
Interpret Incidencehere as referring to Net Correlation weighted appropri-
ately by the prior probability distribution over the states of the common macro-
economic fundamental. The incidence of correlation is zero.
Proof. The incidence is given by:
k
 
B(u
Bad)  uBad   A  uBad  uBad
 k   uBad + z  B(uBad)   uBad + z  A  uBad
+(1  k)  B(uG)  uG  A  uG  uG 
  (1  k)   uG + z  B(uG) ( uG + z  A  uG) = 0
The importance of a zero incidence in contagion or correlation has implica-
tions for econometric techniques designed to predict the occurrence of conta-
gious ows or correlated ows. A zero incidence simply asserts that over the
various states of the common macroeconomic fundamental, contagion or cor-
relation do not vary in a particular way with parameters of the model. Our
results di¤er from Dasgupta (2004) who claims that the incidence of contagion
is positively related to the size of the interbank market in deposits or loans with
the assumption of uniformly distributed fundamentals and error technology. In
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Dasgupta (2004), the presence of the interbank market makes it a conspicuous
candidate for judging the size of contagious ows. While the interbank market
provides regional liquidity insurance, it also provides a channel which spreads a
failure from bank to bank. There is no direct payo¤ dependence in our model
- the only channel through which infomation ows is the public information
channel which a¤ects depositorsbeliefs and decisions. Our interpretation of
zero incidence is tributary to the fact that whilst we controlled for the states
of the common macroeconomic fundamental to gauge the specic cause-e¤ect
relationship, depositorsbeliefs net out over the di¤erent states of the common
fundamental. We purport that while econometric techniques may be helpful
in predicting the occurrence of contagious ows when there are well dened
direct links, they must be used with caution in models in which informational
spillovers link events across banks.
9 Practical Relevance and Applications
Though the model of banking panic transmission highlighted in this paper is
admittedly highly theoretical, it has practical relevance and can o¤er fresh in-
novative insights into ways in which central banks and international institutions
such as the IMF must go about designing the regulatory structure. In the follow-
ing subsections, we present the application of our paper to explaining important
puzzles in the literature and we go on to extol on the innovative framework that
may be used to analyse policy implications so as to improve on the existing
regulatory setting of banksactivities.
9.1 Demystifying important puzzles
Surveying the empirical literature on nancial contagion helps unearth three
puzzles about nancial contagion, which are inextricably linked to one another:
Puzzle 1: (Zero-Link Puzzle) The failure of one nancial intermediary
sometimes leads to the failure of another intermediary when there is no apparent
physical or direct link between them.
Puzzle 2: (Clustering Puzzle) Financial contagion may not arbitrar-
ily spread from one institution to another but rather seems to a¤ect identical
institutions only.
Puzzle 3: (Avoidance Puzzle) Among a set of identical countries / in-
stitutions, some can avoid a contagious ow whereas others cannot.
Models of nancial contagion that focus on direct links ( Allen and Gale
(2000) and Dasgupta (2004) ) do not explain the zero-link issue. The essence of
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these models of contagion is the existence of a direct link itself that lies at the
heart of spreading a crisis from one bank to another. In Allen and Gale (2000)
and Dasgupta (2004), the existence of a network of overlapping interbank claims
provides the key propagator channel, such that a bank failure means that an-
other bank will surely su¤er a loss of interbank claims. Hence, it is more likely
to su¤er from the same fate as the rst bank. If there were no nancial con-
tracts provided by the interbank market for deposits as a way of insuring against
regional liquidity shocks, there would no banking panic transmission. The im-
portance of the zero-link puzzle cannot be underestimated though as evidence
does seem to suggest that crises often propagate to institutions or countries
that share no similarities with the crisis-catalyst institution or country. In our
setup, we have shown that, even with no such direct nancial links between
banks, contagion may still occur in equilibrium. Our model can thus explain
why events in small economies like Thailand can a¤ect behaviour of investors in,
say, Russia, Argentina or Mexico, notwithstanding the insignicance of direct
trade or nancial links between them.
Puzzle 2 has been widely documented by Aharony and Swary (1996) who
conducted a study of 33 US banks in the mid 1990s and found that the ex-
tent of negative impact of contagion is greater for banks that are similar to
the failed bank. Ahluwalia (2000) shows that, for a sample of 19 countries and
three episodes of crises, a countrys vulnerability to contagious crises depends
on the visible similarities between this country and the country actually experi-
encing the crisis. Allen and Gale (2000) and Dasgupta (2004) do not explain the
clustering issue because they focus on homogenous banks throughout and the
strength of connection provided by the direct link is same for all banks. In our
model, we do make the distinction between identical and non-identical banks
in that identical banks are those that share a common exposure to the macro-
economic fundamental. If banks were not linked to the common fundamental (
i .e were not identical), depositors of the second bank would not have adjusted
their beliefs about the macroeconomic fundamental and no crisis would have
spilled over to the other bank. The clustering puzzle of contagion was apparent
in the Tequila crisis from Mexico to Argentina and Brazil in 1994-95, the East
Asian crisis of 1997-98 and the ripple e¤ect of the Russian default in August
1998 on many emerging markets.
Puzzle 3 represents the antithesis of puzzle 2. Among a set of identical coun-
tries or institutions, it may not necessarily be the case that all countries su¤er
a contagious ow when one is hit by a technological / liquidity shock. Some
do manage to avoid a contagious ow of nancial crisis. Countries that succeed
in pre-empting an overseas nancial crisis from a¤ecting them, are those that
inevitably have very strong idiosyncratic fundamentals. In our model, a failure
of bank A, for instance, may not contagiously spread to bank B if depositors of
bank B have strong private signals that dominate any public signal they observe
about bank A. For example, in gures 5(a) and (b) in the graphical appendix,
point O represents such a case. By contrast, point M in gures 5(a) and (b),
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is one in which the public signal element dominates the private information of
depositors (weak idiosyncratic fundamentals) such that bank B su¤ers the same
fate as bank A. Our model will, thus, hypothesise point M as that of Malaysias
case following the crisis in Thailand in 1997. By contrast, point O will be the
case of Singapore, Taiwan or Australia because these countries were immune
from the contagious impact from the rest of East Asia, despite the existence of
strong economic and nancial links with the region.
9.2 Regulatory Mechanism Design - Microprudential v/s
Macroprudential regulations - Challenges for the IMF
and Central Banks
One of the challenges awaiting policymakers such as the IMF and central banks,
is the design of an appropriate regulatory system to ensure nancial stability.
A great part of the literature on banking regulation ( or the design of optimal
regulatory framework for banking) tends to focus on the specic means to pre-
empt the likelihood of nancial contagion. Whilst microprudential regulation
has received much attention and theoretical support, macroprudential regula-
tion has often been ignored in debates over the mosty appropriate form that a
countrys regulatory framework should take.
Microprudential regulation concerns all the preventive measures taken at
individual bank level designed to ward o¤ the possibility of a bank failure be-
ing transmitted to the whole banking and nancial system. It consists mainly
of one-sided policy measures25 either intended to protect the depositors of
the bank or as a general safety net designed to maintain the condence of all
stakeholders in the banking system. Deposit insurance schemes characterise
the former set. Suspension-Of-Convertibility (SOC) and Lender-Of-Last-Resort
(LOLR) characterise the latter set.
In direct linkmodels of nancial contagion, microprudential regulatory
measures would work in pre-empting the transmission of a banking panic. Since
contagious crises arise essentially because of interdependence and are transmit-
ted through channels that remain unchanged in all states of the world (non-
tranquil periods and tranquil periods), the commonly held Help one, Save all
syndrome works. Microprudential measures, however, do not work e¤ectively
if the main reason for bank failure is some commonly based fundamental that
links both banks. For example, as mentioned in the introductory section, sup-
pose two banks have received nancial contracts (lent) in euros and have issued
nancial contracts (borrowed from depositors) in dollars. A depreciation of the
25We use the term one-sidedmeasure because we shall be assuming that the policy applies
only to the bank facing the crisis. There is no randomisation among the banks ( i.e good
banks or bad banks) and no economy-wide safety net. Forbes and Rigobon (2001) describe
these one-sided measures as isolation strategies.
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dollar against the euro could negatively a¤ect the balance sheet of both banks
and lead to premature withdrawals by depositors in each bank. In this case, the
interbank market does not help as a liquidity reshu­ ing mechanism. One-sided
measures do not work here either. What is needed is some policy action de-
signed at targeting the common macroeconomic fundamental that is commonly
driving both banksperformance e.g limit the uctuation of the dollar against
the euro by designing some form of explicit exchange rate arrangement that will
achieve this goal of currency stability. In the South East Asian crisis of 1997,
the banking panic throughout the region occured because of the banksexpo-
sure to extreme exchange rate changes, which softened their balance sheets and
made them much more vulnerable and prone to bank runs. In instances such
as these, macroprudential regulation should be given the overriding concern.
Microprudential regulatory measures in a one-bank setting (the current lit-
erature paradigm) still seem best at pre-empting the likelihood of a crisis from
existing in one bank by e¤ectively acting as a mechanism that coordinates the
beliefs of depositors of that bank on the right equilibrium. However, in a two-
bank setting with informational externalities, the mechanism implicit in the
transmission process of information may create feedback e¤ects that have reper-
cussions on depositors of other banks. Thus, tackling a liquidity crisis at a bank
(e.g Bank of Englands intervention to provide assistance to Northern Rock in
2007) may have a signalling value that a¤ects the behaviour of depositors of
other banks in the UK economy, such that the liquidity assistance becomes
counterproductive. The appropriate design of microprudential policy measures
by a central bank must take into account this signal spillover e¤ect. Clearly,
solving a liquidity crisis at one bank may be sub-optimal if other depositors
in the economy interpret this as a sign of panic and start worrying about the
medium-term prospects of their own banks. In this case, we have a intertempo-
ral substitution of a nancial crisis across banks. A banking economy in which,
say, suspension is adopted as a policy instrument at the crisis-catalyst bank,
may send the wrong signals to depositors of other banks26 . By contrast, a
LOLR banking economy does better at eliminating contagious ows because
the LOLR measure at one bank may send a positive or negative signal to de-
positors of the second bank27 . The optimal design of microprudential measures
should trade o¤ the contemporary positive impact of solving a liquidity-based
crisis at the cost of future information-induced crisis at other banks.
If the future costs weigh more than the current benets, does that sug-
gest that microprudential policy measures should never be implemented ? One
possible way of achieving pareto improvement will be for the central bank to
successfully maintain condence of depositors at a high level across banks, when
implementing a liquidity-based prudential measure at one bank. The Northern
Rock crisis of 2007 showed that this should have been the optimal response
of the Bank of England in its interventionist role to achieve nancial stability.
26See Note I in the Additional Notessection.
27See Note J in the Additional Notessection.
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Ostensibly, how to maintain condence across banks is subject to disagreement
among practitioners. While our model does not tell us about the exact form
these safeguards should take, it does improve on the existing literature on (one-
bank) liquidity-based policy intervention measures in that it provides a logical
framework that rationalises the case for such appropriate safeguards to accom-
pany the conventional type of policy intervention. To sum up, we have three
cases that can be Pareto-Ranked:
Summary 2: (Policy Intervention and Paretian Ranking) In our
model, we conjecture that microprudential liquidity-based measures administered
by the central bank under the current paradigm, are not potent due to the pres-
ence of intertemporal substitution of a banking crisis. A superior outcome will
be to accompany these liquidity-based interventionist measures by appropriate
condence safeguardsthroughout the rest of the nancial system. These con-
dence safeguards work as a pivotal mechanism that coordinates the expectations
of depositors across banks on the right outcome by ensuring that the positive sig-
nals are sent to these other depositors in the economy. This mechanism pareto
improveson the current paradigm and achieves the twinned aims of containing
a crisis at a catalyst bank and of preventing intertemporal substitution. In case
wrong signals are sent, these liquidity-based measures may help create a chan-
nel of nancial contagion of their own. This outcome is pareto inferiorto the
current paradigm.
This new implication for microprudential policy design is important, because
it tells us that in sequential games with informational spillovers, there are dif-
ferent ways for depositors in an economy to interpret the implementation of a
given liquidity-based prudential measure at a bank: instead of acting as a coor-
dination mechanism for depositors of the same bank (as the current one-bank
paradigm will warrant), these measures need to coordinate the expectations and
beliefs of depositors across di¤erent banks on the correct equilibrium. For that,
it is imperative that positive signals through appropriately-designed safeguards,
are sent.
10 Conclusion
In this paper, we have attempted to build a theoretical model of contagious bank
runs which uses the informational spillover channel to explain the transmission
of failures from one bank to another. We show that, in each bank, there exists a
trigger equilibrium which depends on the state of the common macroeconomic
fundamental. Our results thus corroborate the robustness of Dasgupta (2004).
We go beyond the interdependence paradigm of Dasgupta (2004) by showing
that, for banks with common macroeconomic exposures, a multiple bank fail-
ure will contain elements of both, contagious and correlated banking failures
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and that these elements are indissociable from each other. The characterisation
of the trigger equilibrium enables us distinguish between the contagious and
the correlated elements in probability terms. Contagion represents an endoge-
nous state-contingent change in cross-bank correlation and occurs when there is
public informational dominance in bank B depositorsdecision set. Distilling
between contagion and correlation is important for any central bank since they
have di¤erent implications for policy implementation. Our model thus o¤ers
fresh insights on policy implementation for central banks.
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12 Appendix (Technical)
PROOF OF REMARKS 1 AND 2
Remark 1: (No-Dominance signal segment) Attention will be restricted
to the segment of the signal space in which there is strategic interraction (i.e
Dominance is ruled out). This means that s lies in interval [sL; sU ] ; where
sL  uG   " and sU  uBad + z + ".
Remark 2: (Uniformity of Prior and Posterior distribution) While
the prior distribution of the idiosyncratic fundamental is common knowledge
and follows the uniform distribution law, the posterior distribution of the idio-
syncratic fundamental, through specic restrictions on the degree of precision
of the signals, will also follow the uniform distribution law. The necessary and
su¢ cient condition for that restriction on the noise structure is: 2" < uG:
Proof: While the prior distribution of the idiosyncratic fundamental is uni-
form, it only su¢ ces to impose su¢ cient structure on the noise technology in
order to be assured of uniformity in posterior estimates of the idiosyncratic
fundamental. We know that the error technology is uniformly distributed on
[ ";+"], with density rate 12" and that the prior distribution of the idiosyncratic
fundamental is uniform on [0; 1] : In order to guarantee that the posterior dis-
tribution of i, conditional on observing the private signal s; is uniform, we need
to ensure that the support of i, conditional on s, namely [s  "; s+ "], lies ex-
actly within the range that allows for strategic interraction among depositors
i.e

uG   "; uBad + z + ".
[1] We require that min [s  "; s+ "] > 0: Restriction uG   " > 0 implies
that " < uG: Furthermore, the assumption that s > sL (to rule out dominance
as per remark 6) is implied by setting s > inffs : Pr ob( < L j s) < 1g:
Thus, we are left with a restriction that " < s: However, to allow for strategic
interraction, s > uG   ": The fact that " < s) " < uG   ": Thus, 2" < uG:
[2]We require that max [s  "; s+ "] < 1: This implies s+" < 1) " < 1 s:
With Restriction

uBad + z + "

< 1, the assumption that s < sU (to rule out
dominance as per remark 6), implies that s < uBad+ z+ ": Since " < 1  s; we
can rewrite the whole expression as " < 1  uBad + z + ") 2" < 1 uBad z:
Thus, restriction

uG   " > 0 and restriction uBad + z + " < 1 imply that
2" < min[uG; 1  uBad   z]: By assumptions [a:1] ; [a:2] and [a:3] in section 2.1,
we know that 0 < uG < uBad + z < 1; implying that uG < 1  uBad   z: Thus,
restriction 2" < uG is a necessary and su¢ cient condition for the uniform law
to be applicable to posterior distribution
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
Proposition 1: If the event in Bank A is used for Bayesian updating only,
then the Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium of the dynamic game between  A;t=1 and
 B;t=1 can be represented as a trigger equilibrium.
Proof: (use of Intermediate Value Theorem)
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Let assessments f (At=1); (Bt=1)g and f ; 0g denote the Perfect Bayesian
Equilibrium of the game between  A;t=1 and  B;t=1 . Any depositor in  t=1
; will play a best-response to actions of predecessors and successors (where
applicable), with the best response function dened by 	A(:) = max[2P  
1]
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))(uA j At=1)d and	B(:) = max[2P 1]
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))(u j
Bt=1)d; depending on whether he plays in  A;t=1 or in  B;t=1 :
For a depositor in  A;t=1; the expected utility, EU [s; ] = [2P 1]
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))d;varies
continuously with s: High values of  are associated with low value of propor-
tion of early withdrawals, (s; ): Thus, net payo¤ to staying, (; (s; )
is high and greater probability is attached to staying in the EU [s; ] =
P
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))d+ (1 P )
Z s
s "
(; (s; ))d expression elaborated in
section 4.2 of the main text. For low realisations of ; we have a reverse order-
ing: (s; ) is high and (; (s; ) takes a low (negative) value and greater
probability is attached to the negative element of EU [s; ]: Thus, generalising
the argument to any depositor (no matter to which game he belongs to), we
can argue that he will stay if EU [s; ] > 0 and will withdraw if EU [s; ]  0 .
Since EU [s; ] is continuous and monotonically increasing in s; then by the
intermediate value theorem, 9 s such that 8s > s; EU [s; ] > 0 and 8s  s;
EU [s; ] < 0: In line with the best -responce function 	A(:); 9 A(A;t=1) such
that:
A(A;t=1) =

W if s  s
S if s > s

which corresponds exactly to the notion of switching equilibrium that we
stated in the main text.
.
For depositor in  B;t=1 ; the expected utility is given by expression: EU [s; 0] =
[2P   1]
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))d: When bank A survives, 
 = fSAg ; and bank
B has a high idiosyncratic fundamental, (s; ) is low. Thus, the probabil-
ity of an individual depositor staying becomes high and EU [s; 0] has relatively
more of the
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))d (> 0) component and relatively less of theZ s
s "
(; (s; ))d(< 0): Thus,EU [sB ; 0] > 0 when the idiosyncratic funda-
mental of bank B is high and when 
 = fSAg is observed.
When 
 = fFAg and bank B has a low idiosyncratic fundamental, (s; ) is
high. Here, EU [s; 0] has relatively less of the
Z s+"
s
(; (s; ))d (> 0) com-
ponent and relatively more of the
Z s
s "
(; (s; ))d (< 0): Thus, EU [s; 0] <
0 for low realisations of the idiosyncratic fundamental and when 
 = fFAg is
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observed: Thus, the perfect bayesian equilibrium concept will lead depositors in
 B;t=1; to follow a strategy along the following lines:
(Bt=1) =
8>><>>:
W if ( 
A = fFAg) \ ( s  s)
S if ( 
A = fSAg) \ ( s  s)
S or W if

either
 
( 
A = fSAg) \ ( s  s)
or
 
( 
A = fFAg) \ ( s > s))

9>>=>>;
which is exactly the trigger equilibrium we dened in the main text.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2(a)
Proposition 2(a): (Existence of a Trigger Equilibrium) In each de-
positors game, there exists a threshold s such that he withdraws if s  s and
stays if s > s
Proof: (The following proof is valid for depositors of either bank - thus, we
remove any subscripts or superscipts )
We know that if s < uG   "; this means that  < uG: By the dominance
assumption we have elaborated in the main text, this implies that the net payo¤
to staying is negative in this region. In a similar line of thought, if s > uBad +
z + "; then  > uBad + z: We are here in the upper dominance region. Here,
the net payo¤ to staying is strictly positive. By remarks 1 and 2, we are not
interested in dominance regions however. The logic behind conceptualising the
lower and upper dominance regions means that for the tails of the signal spaces,
the net payo¤ structure takes unambiguous negative and positive values. Thus,
there is a point in the signal space lying in the

uG   "; uBad + z + " interval
at which the net payo¤ is equal to zero. Let this point be point s: We shall
proceed to explain the existence of s in two steps: (i) we will show that, for a
marginal depositor, the net payo¤ to staying is increasing and continuous in s
assuming that all depositors follow the switching strategy and (ii) we will show
that for any s  s; this net payo¤ is negative and for any s > s; it is positive.
Step 1:
Each depositor in  i;t=1; i = fA;Bg, faces a uniform posterior belief over i,
conditional on observing his private signal s: Thus, we can model that posterior
belief formally as : i j s  Uniform[s   "; s + "]; "  s  1   ". Assuming
that all other depositors in  i;t=1 follow a switching strategy, the proportion of
patient depositors withdrawing early can be modelled as follows:
[; s] =
8<:
1  < s   "
1
2 +
(s )
2" s
   "    s + "
0  > s + "
9=;
Building on table 2, the net payo¤ to staying as opposed to withdrawing for
each depositor in  i;t=1can be re-parameterised in terms of  and sas follows:
(; s) =
Z s+"
s "
(; [; s]) d
Recall, in section 2.3, we segregated the performance of a given bank into a
bankruptcy and a no-bankruptcy space. Using the terminologies employed, it
can be shown that:
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In the Bankruptcy Condition Space, [; s] > r =) f[ 12+ (s
 )
2" ] > rg =)f < s + "(1  2r)g
In the No-Bankruptcy Condition Space, [; s] < r =) f[ 12 + (s
 )
2" ] <
rg =) f < s + "(1  2r)g
Thus, we may partition (; s) =
Z s+"
s "
(; [; s]) d into the Bank-
ruptcy Condition Space and the No-Bankruptcy Condition Space as follows:
(; s) =
Z s+"
s+"(1 2r)
fU
f(1 )  (1 )r gR(:)
(1 )(1 )

 U(1)g d+
Z s+"(1 2r)
s "
fU(0) 
U
h
+r(1 )
+(1 )
i
g d
=
Z s+"
s+"(1 2r)
U
f(1 )  (1 )r gR(:)
(1 )(1 )

d 
Z s+"(1 2r)
s "
U
h
+r(1 )
+(1 )
i
d + fU(0)[2"(1  r)]  U(1)[2"r]:
Now, let U
f(1 )  (1 )r gR(:)
(1 )(1 )

be denoted as (; s), let U
h
+r(1 )
+(1 )
i
be
denoted as (; s); let fU(0)[2"(1  r)]  U(1)[2"r] be a constant, : A much
simpler expression for (; s) would be as follows:
(; s) =
Z s+"
s+"(1 2r)
(; s) d+
Z s+"(1 2r)
s "
(; s) d + 
We are interested in establishing how (; s) varies with s: Take deriva-
tives with respect to s throughout:
@
@s(; s
) = @@s
Z s+"
s+"(1 2r)
(; s) d + @@s
Z s+"(1 2r)
s "
(; s) d
We proceed with the integrals separately:
@
@s
Z s+"
s+"(1 2r)
(; s) d = [(; s)]s
+"
s+"(1 2r)+
Z s+"
s+"(1 2r)
@
@s [(; s
)] d
@
@s
Z s+"(1 2r)
s "
(; s) d =[(; s)]s
+"(1 2r)
s " +
Z s+"(1 2r)
s "
@
@s [(; s
)]
d
The following properties hold for (; s) and (; s) : (1)@(;s
)
@ < 0;
(2)@(;s
)
@ < 0, (3)
@(;s)
@s > 0, (4)
@(;s)
@ < 0; (5)
@(;s)@s  = @(;s)@  :
By (1) and (3), @(;s
)
@s < 0: By (1) and (4),
@(;s)
@ > 0: This gives rise
to the important property that:
Z s+"
s+"(1 2r
@
@ [(; s
)]d ;as represented by
[(; s)]s
+"
s+"(1 2r) , exceeds
Z s+"
s+"(1 2r)
@
@s [(; s
)] d . This implies that
@
@s
Z s+"
s+"(1 2r)
(; s) d > 0:
Repeating the same exercise for (; s); we can see that by (6) @(;s
)
@s < 0,
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(7) @(;s
)
@ > 0:Given (5),(6) and (7), it can be established that
Z s+"(1 2r)
s "
@
@s [(; s
)]
d =  
Z s+"(1 2r)
s "
@
@ [(; s
)] d: Thus, @@s
Z s+"(1 2r)
s "
(; s) d = 0: Through
the values of @@s
Z s+"
s+"(1 2r)
(; s) d and @@s
Z s+"(1 2r)
s "
(; s) d , we can
establish that @@s(; s
) > 0: Thus, there exists a value of s that solves the
model for any (; s) = 0: We have thus proved that (; s) is continuous in
s over the [s   "; s + "] range.
Step 2:
Dene the net payo¤to staying for a marginal depositor(; s) =
Z s+"
s "
(; [; s])
d = 0 (assuming that all other depositors follow a switching strategy). Also,
dene (; s) =
Z s+"
s "
(; [; s]) d as the net payo¤ to staying for a depositor
who receives a signal s: The assumption of continuity means that (; s) is con-
tinuous in s in the signal range that allows for strategic interraction between
depositors. Consider signals that are smaller than s : For extremely low realisa-
tions of signals, we will be in the lower dominance region and the net payo¤will
be strictly negative. For some s  s; the net payo¤ dened by the integral over
the range [s  "; s+ "] ; involves adding a negative element to the structure and
taking away part of the positive element. Thus, (; s) (
Z s+"
s "
(; [; s]) d)
< (; s)
 

Z s+"
s "
(; [; s]) d = 0
!
: Thus, by a contagious element,
any s  s is compatible with negative net payo¤. Depositors withdraw un-
ambiguously when they receive a signal which is less than s: A similar line of
thought will show that when s > s; (; s) (
Z s+"
s "
(; [; s]) d) > (; s) 

Z s+"
s "
(; [; s]) d = 0
!
: By a contagiou s element, any s > s is com-
patible with positive net payo¤. Depositors stay unambiguously when they
receive a signal which is more than s:
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3
Proposition 3: (Existence and Features of ) By Propositions 2(a)
and 2(b), there exists a threshold in each bank, above which the bank succeeds
and below which the bank fails. In addition, for either bank, the location of 
has the property that (uBad) > (uG) with uBad > uG
Proof: The analysis is relevant for depositors of either bank (except where
otherwise stated). We proceed in two steps:
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Step 1: Existence of 
We start with a marginal depositor in  i;t=1who observes s = s and who
believes that all other depositors in  i;t=1 will follow a switching strategy around
s: For any particular realisations of the state of the common macroeconomic
fundamental; there exists a critical value of  that ensures that, from the returns
technology given in table 1,
crit = u+z[; s] where [; s] =
8<:
1 s >  + "
1
2 +
(s )
2"    "  s   + "
0 s <    "
9=;
Using the expression for [; s] , crit can be expressed as:
crit =
8<: u+ z s
 >  + "
u+ z2"f(s   ) + "g    "  s   + "
u s <    "
9=;
Thus,
crit( u) =
8<:
u+ z s > u+ z + "
z(s+")+2"u
z+2" u  "  s  u + z + "
u s  u   "
9=;
Step 2: Features of 
When we showed (; s) as being strictly increasing in s(as per proposition
2(a)), we kept the state of the common macroeconomic fundamental as constant.
However, with the property depicted in gure 2(b) in the graphical appendix, it
turns out that whenever the common fundamental moves from a good state to a
bad one, (; s; uBad) lies below (; s; uG) for any s: Thus, with the single-
crossing property established in proposition 2(a) and 2(b), it turns out that s
derived from (; s; uBad) lies to the right of the s derived from (; s; uG):
How does that a¤ect the threshold value of the idiosyncratic fundamental ?
We know thatconditional on the state of the common fundamental, the critical
threshold will be given by:
crit( uBad) =
8<:
uBad + z s > uBad + z + "
z(s+")+2"uBad
z+2" u
Bad   "  s  uBad + z + "
uBad s  uBad   "
9=;
crit( uG) =
8<:
uG + z s > uG + z + "
z(s+")+2"uG
z+2" u
G   "  s  uG + z + "
uG s  uG   "
9=;
Thus, with uBad > uG; it follows that 
 
uBad

> crit( uG):
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4:
Proposition 4: (Learning Mechanism) Upon observing the failure of
bank A, the probability that the common macroeconomic fundamental was in
its bad state is more likely than unconditionally. Thus, (1) Pr ob(u = uBad j
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FA) > Pr ob(u = u
Bad) > Pr ob(u = uBad j SA) Similarly, conditional on
observing the success of bank A, the probability that the common macroeconomic
fundamental was in its good state is more likely than unconditionally. Thus, (2)
Pr ob(u = uG j SA) > Pr ob(u = uG) > Pr ob(u = uG j FA)
Proof:
(1) With the all-important property that, if uBad > uG; then A(u
Bad) >
A(u
G) by proposition 3; it can be inferred that A(u
Bad) > k:A(u
Bad) + (1 
k):A(u
G); 0  k < 1: Thus, A(uBad)
k:A(u
Bad)+(1 k):A(uG) > 1)
k:A(u
Bad)
k:A(u
Bad)+(1 k):A(uG) >
k: This implies that: Pr ob(u = uBad j FA) = k:

A(u
Bad)
k:A(u
Bad)+(1 k):A(uG) > k: Sub-
sequently, Pr ob(u = uBad j FA) > Pr ob(u = uBad) where Pr ob(u = uBad) = k:
Similarly, if uBad > uG; then 1   A(uBad) < 1   A(uG): Thus, it must be
the case that 1   A(uBad) < k:[1   A(uBad)] + (1   k):[1   A(uG)]: Thus,
1 A(uBad)
k:[1 A(uBad)]+(1 k):[1 A(uG)] < 1 =)
k:[1 A(uBad)]
k:[1 A(uBad)]+(1 k):[1 A(uG)] < k: Sub-
sequently, Pr ob(u = uBad j SA) < Pr ob(u = uBad) where Pr ob(u = uBad) = k:
This establishes the general result that: Pr ob(u = uBad j FA) > Pr ob(u =
uBad) > Pr ob(u = uBad j SA)
(2) can be proved in a similar way. With A(u
G) < A(u
Bad) by propo-
sition 3 ) (1   k)A(uG) < (1   k)A(uBad): We can express A(uG) as
a linear function: A(u
G) < kA(u
G) + (1   k)A(uBad): This implies that
A(u
G)
kA(u
G)+(1 k)A(uB) < 1:Multiply both sides by (1 k) yields:
(1 k)A(uG)
kA(u
G)+(1 k)A(uBad) <
(1 k): But (1 k)A(uG)
kA(u
G)+(1 k)A(uBad) = Pr ob(u = u
G j FA) and (1 k) = Pr ob(u =
uG): This therefore suggests that Pr ob(u = uG j FA) < Pr ob(u = uG): With
A(u
G) < A(u
Bad)) 1 A(uG) > 1 A(uBad)) (1 k)[1 A(uG)] > (1 
k)[1 A(uBad)]: In turn, [1 A(uG)] > k

1  A(uG)

+(1 k)[1 A(uBad)];
which implies that [1 

A(u
G)]
k[1 A(uG)]+(1 k)[1 A(uBad)]
> 1: Multiplying both sides
by (1  k) yields (1 k)[1 A(uG)]
k[1 A(uG)]+(1 k)[1 A(uBad)]
> (1   k): As derived above,
(1 k)[1 A(uG)]
k[1 A(uG)]+(1 k)[1 A(uBad)]
= Pr ob(u = uG j SA) and (1 k) = Pr ob(u = uG):
This suggests that Pr ob(u = uG j SA) > Pr ob(u = uG): We have therefore
proved the general result for (2), that, Pr ob(u = uG j SA) > Pr ob(u = uG) >
Pr ob(u = uG j FA)
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5:
Proposition 5: The posterior estimates of the state of the common macro-
economic fundamental by depositors of bank B retain all mathematical proper-
ties of propositions 2(a), 2(b) and 3. Furthermore, observing the failure (suc-
cess) of bank A pushes the trigger of bank B upwards (downwards), such that
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FAB (u) > 

B(u)

SAB (u) < 

B(u) respectively

: Thus, bank B now fails (suc-
ceeds) for larger realisations of its own idiosyncratic fundamentals.
Proof:
Recall that when we derived the properties of (; s) in propositions 2(a)
and 2(b), we took the state of the common fundamental as given. The analy-
sis was thus conned to some conditional payo¤ function, where the state of
the common fundamental was xed. For depositors in bank A, the uncondi-
tional payo¤ is a linear combination of the net payo¤ structure over the prior
probabilities of the state of the common fundamental. Thus, (; s) = 
(; s; uBad)+(1  ) (; s; uG): Logically, it follows that (; s) is increas-
ing in s and all analysis that we previously studied, will go through. There is
a unique s and a corresponding (u):
Depositors of bank B have the advantage that they can learn on the state of
the common fundamental by observing the event in bank A, where the learning
mechanism was explicated in proposition 4. Thus, upon observing bank As
failure, they will infer that there is greater likelihood that the common macro-
economic fundamental was in its bad state. Their unconditional payo¤ will be
a linear combination of their conditional net payo¤ structure over the poste-
rior probabilities of the state of the common fundamental. Thus, =(; s) =
Pr ob(u = uBad j FA) (; s; uBad)+Pr ob(u = uG j FA) (; s; uG): It follows
that =(; s) is increasing in s and that there is a unique s for depositors in
bank B as well. With the above assumption of Pr ob(u = uBad j FA) >  and
Pr ob(u = uG j FA) < 1  ; it turns out that =(; s) lies below (; s): Let
FAB (u) denote the new critical threshold of bank B that is derived from 
=(; s).
By the properties of Proposition 3, step 2, it follows that FAB (u) > 

B(u):
Upon observing bank As success, depositors of bank B will infer that there
is greater likelihood that the common macroeconomic fundamental was in its
good state, as per proposition 4. Their unconditional payo¤ will be given as
follows: =(; s) = Pr ob(u = uBad j SA) (; s; uBad) + Pr ob(u = uG j SA)
(; s; uG): It follows that =(; s) is increasing in s and that there is a
unique s . With the above assumption of Pr ob(u = uBad j SA) <  and
Pr ob(u = uG j SA) > 1  ; it turns out that =(; s) lies above (; s): Let
SAB (u) denote the new critical threshold of bank B that is derived from 
=(; s).
By the properties of Proposition 3, step 2, it follows that SAB (u) < 

B(u):
FINAL NOTE ON TRIGGER EQUILIBRIUM
(A) FOLLOWING FROM THE EXISTENCE OF A TRIGGER EQUI-
LIBRIUM
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Pr ob(FA j u = uB) = A(uBad)
Pr ob(FA j u = uG) = A(uG)
Pr ob(SA j u = uB) = 1  A(uBad)
Pr ob(SA j u = uG) = 1  A(uG)
(B) BAYESIAN UPDATING
1) Pr ob(u = uBad j FA) = P (FAju=u
Bad)P (u=uBad)
P (FAju=uBad)P (u=uBad)+P (FAju=uG)P (u=uG)
=
k:A(u
Bad)
k:A(u
Bad)+(1 k)A(uG)
2) Pr ob(u = uBad j SA) = P (SAju=u
Bad)P (u=uBad)
P (SAju=uBad)P (u=uBad)+P (SAju=uG)P (u=uG)
=
k:(1 A(uBad))
k:(1 A(uBad))+(1 k)(1 A(uG))
3) Prob(u = uG j SA) = 1 Pr ob(u = uBad j SA) = (1 k)(1 

A(u
G))
(1 k)(1 A(uBad)) + k(1 A(uG))
4) Prob(u = uG j FA) = 1  Pr ob(u = uBad j FA) = (1 k)

A(u
G)
(1 k)A(uBad) + kA(uG)
(C) CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES
5) Pr(FB j fu = uBadg \ FA) = FAB; uBad
6) Pr(FB j fu = uGg \ FA) = FAB; uG
7) Pr(FB j fu = uBadg \ SA) = SAB; uBad
8) Pr(FB j fu = uGg \ SA) = SAB; uG
Similarly,
9) Pr(SB j fu = uBadg \ SA) = 1  SAB; uBad
10) Pr(SB j fu = uGg \ SA) = 1  SAB; uG
11) Pr(SB j fu = uBadg \ FA) = 1  FAB; uBad
12) Pr(SB j fu = uGg \ FA) = 1  FAB; uG
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(D) CONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES (CONTD..)
13) Pr(FB j Bt=1; FA) = Pr(FB j fu = uBadg \ FA) Pr(fu = uBadg j FA)+
Pr(FB j fu = uGg \ FA) Pr(fu = uGg j FA):
=FA
B; uBad
h
k:A(u
Bad)
k:A(u
Bad)+(1 k)A(uG)
i
+ FA
B; uG
h
1 

k:A(u
Bad)
k:A(u
Bad)+(1 k)A(uG)
i
=

FA
B; uBad
  FA
B; uG
 h
k:A(u
Bad)
k:A(u
Bad)+(1 k)A(uG)
i
+ FA
B; uG
14) Pr(FB j Bt=1; SA) = Pr(FB j fu = uBadg \ SA) Pr(fu = uBadg j SA)+
Pr(FB j fu = uGg \ SA) Pr(fu = uGg j SA):
=SA
B; uBad
h
k:(1 A(uBad))
k:(1 A(uBad))+(1 k)(1 A(uG))
i
+SA
B; uG
h
1 

k:(1 A(uBad))
k:(1 A(uBad))+(1 k)(1 A(uG))
i
=

SA
B; uBad
  SA
B; uG
 h
k:(1 A(uBad))
k:(1 A(uBad))+(1 k)(1 A(uG))
i
+ SA
B; uG
Proof. Pr(FB j Bt=1; FA) > Pr(FB j Bt=1; SA)
Clearly, (i) k:

A(u
Bad)
k:A(u
Bad)+(1 k)A(uG) >
k:(1 A(uBad))
k:(1 A(uBad))+(1 k)(1 A(uG)) as estab-
lished in main text
(ii) FA
B; uBad
  FA
B; uG
> SA
B; uBad
  SA
B; uG
(iii) FA
B; uG
> SA
B; uG
Thus, each of the component part of Pr(FB j Bt=1; FA) exceeds that of
Pr(FB j Bt=1; SA):This completes this mini-proof.
Similarly,
15) Pr(SB j Bt=1; SA) = Pr(SB j fu = uBadg \ SA) Pr(fu = uBadg j SA)+
Pr(SB j fu = uGg \ SA) Pr(fu = uGg j SA):
=1 
n
k(1 A(uBad))B(uBad)+(1 k)(1 A(uG))B(uG)
1 kA(uBad) (1 k)A(uG)
o
16) Pr(SB j Bt=1; FA) = Pr(SB j fu = uBadg \ FA) Pr(fu = uBadg j FA)+
Pr(SB j fu = uGg \ FA) Pr(fu = uGg j FA):
=1 
n
kA(u
Bad)B(u
Bad) + (1 k)A(uG)B(uG)
kA(u
Bad) + (1 k)A(uG)
o
Proof. Similarly, it can be proved that Pr(SB j Bt=1; SA) > Pr(SB j
Bt=1; FA)
The proof is left to the reader.
17) Event probabilities - A summary
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(i) Pr(FB j Bt=1; FA) =
n
kA(u
Bad)B(u
Bad) + (1 k)A(uG)B(uG)
kA(u
Bad) + (1 k)A(uG)
o
(ii) Pr(FB j Bt=1; SA) =
n
k(1 A(uBad))B(uBad)+(1 k)(1 A(uG))B(uG)
1 kA(uBad) (1 k)A(uG)
o
(iii) Pr(SB j Bt=1; FA) = 1 
n
kA(u
Bad)B(u
Bad) + (1 k)A(uG)B(uG)
kA(u
Bad) + (1 k)A(uG)
o
(iv) Pr(SB j Bt=1; SA) = 1 
n
k(1 A(uBad))B(uBad)+(1 k)(1 A(uG))B(uG)
1 kA(uBad) (1 k)A(uG)
o
(E) UNCONDITIONAL PROBABILITIES
18) P (FA) = Pr(FA j u = uBad) Pr(u = uBad)+ Pr(FA j u = uG) Pr(u =
uG):
19) P (SA) = Pr(SA j u = uBad) Pr(u = uBad)+ Pr(SA j u = uG) Pr(u =
uG):
20) P (FB) = Pr(FB j Bt=1; FA)P (FA)+ Pr(FB j Bt=1; SA)P (SA)
21) P (SB) = Pr(SB j Bt=1; FA)P (FA)+ Pr(SB j Bt=1; SA)P (SA)
13 Additional Notes
A. The Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model was instrumental in concocting a mi-
crotheoretic account of bank balance sheets by allowing for liquidity preference
shocks modelled as uncertainty about the timing of consumption preferences,
asset-liability maturity mismatch and inverse relationship between liquidity and
protability. Banks exist as a mechanism that provide insurance against liq-
uidity preference shocks. By pooling the endowments of the investor, they o¤er
demand deposit contracts that make promises of consumption contingent on the
date of withdrawal of the investor. The latter achieves better combination of
liquidity services and returns on investment than alternative mechanisms such
as nancial markets. A natural result of a bank engaged in such maturity and
liquidity transformation activity is that it must have a balance sheet that makes
it prone to various risks.
B. The optimal level of bank regulation is subject to debate. A new eld in
microeconomic theory of banks is that banking panics are viewed as a natural
consequence of a banking system fullling its allocational roles as highlighted
by the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) environment, highlighted in A above. Thus,
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any attempt to deal with banking crises ex-ante through the adoption of ap-
propriate regulatory guidelines, will inevitably impinge on the ability of the
banking system to perform its roles e¢ ciently. Whether banking regulation is
desirable or not, crucially depends on the benets of such regulation exceeding
the cost of so-doing. These models trade-o¤ the ex-post benets of avoiding
bank failures with the ex-ante drawbacks of impinging on the banks ability to
fulll its allocational roles.
C. The concept of nancial contagion described here is a restricted version
of an all embracing general term: that of systemic risk. With nancial
contagion, we are concerned with a case involving multiple banks and there
is no interaction of banks with nancial markets. One concept of systemic
risk allows for the interaction between a bank and a nancial market in an
incomplete market setup, and which leads to excess price volatility for the asset
that the bank holds. Excessive (endogenous) asset price volatility may prevent
banks from getting liquidity when they need it the most and may mean that
the bank is unable to meet its contractual arrangements to pay depositors and
eventually fails. Systemic risks may alternatively refer to the transmission of a
crisis from bank to bank (with transmission mechanism broadly dened) so that
there is an overall nancial meltdown. See Moheeput (2005) for more details
on systemic risks and, in particular, its decomposition into micro-systemic and
macro-systemic risks.
D. Brief expose of Real Contagion Models: Allen and Gale (2000) fo-
cus on the network architecture connecting banks as the main driver of nancial
contagion. Banks cross-hold deposits at the beginning of the experiment as in-
surance against regional liquidity shocks. While the interbank deposits provide
insurance, they also create a pattern of overlapping interbank claims that can
easily propagate a crisis from one bank to another. This is what happens in the
presence of aggregate liquidity shocks. Allen and Gale (2000) stress that the
particular form of connectedness matters for the occurrence of nancial conta-
gion. A complete network contains implicit mechanism for checking contagious
ows whereas an incomplete network is susceptible to ow of crisis across the
system.
Dasgupta (2004) considers a model identical to Allen and Gale (2000), but
adopts the global games approach to characterise contagion and examine its
properties. The model does not rely on the presence of aggregate liquidity
shocks as trigger for a banking crisis. Rather, bad fundamentals on the banks
asset side are the initiators of a banking crisis, and the existence of an inter-
bank market for deposits, acts as propagator of the crisis across banks. Using
the global games approach to identify a unique trigger equilibrium has a num-
ber of appealling features: Financial contagion occurs as a unique equilibrium
phenomenon and, for a given range of bank fundamental values, one bank fails
just only because the other bank has failed. Furthermore the probability of
contagion arises endogenously and is positive. This feature enables the charac-
terisation of the optimal level of interbank deposits by trading o¤ the benets of
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extra regional liquidity insurance with the costs of greater contagious risk. As a
result, the interbank contract provides less than full insurance against regional
shocks. Furthermore, Dasgupta (2004) results are robust in that the occurrence
of contagion does not rely on network architecture connecting banks. Even
under a complete network, nancial contagion arises with positive probability.
Rochet and Tirole (1996) consider the benets of contagious risks as providers
of incentives for peer monitoring among banks in a setup involving moral hazard
and lack of contractibility between debt holders and bank managers on man-
ager e¤orts. The model considers banking regulation as the interaction between
interbank lending and peer monitoring in the interbank market. It focuses
on an optimal regulatory system as being one that can minimise the risks of
contagious risks ex-post, while being able to preserve the incentives for peer
monitoring ex-ante. Banks that have lent to others, should have their survival
tied to the performance of the borrowing banks, and should be closed if the bor-
rowing banks become insolvent / illiquid. Contagion should be allowed in order
to provide incentives for banks to monitor each other ex-ante. This nonetheless
limits the practical relevance of monitoring, since allowing too many banks to
fail, is not a credible policy for a fully committed central bank ex-post.
Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) study contagion of self-fullling nancial crises
as a result of wealth e¤ect for investors. Unlike the above models, the markets
in Goldstein and Pauzner (2004) do not share fundamentals but share investors
instead. This provides a clear-cut example of the third branch of real contagion
models explained in the main text. Due to the presence of strategic comple-
mentarities in investment decisions, investors are exposed to the strategic un-
certainty about the unknown behaviour of other investors. Thus, a crisis in one
country, by reducing wealth of investors, makes the latter more risk averse. As
a result, they have lesser incentives to remain invested in the other country.
The likelihood of a nancial crisis in the other country is higher even though
countries are independent of each other in terms of fundamentals.
E. Brief expose of Pure Contagion Models: Considering a model of
banking, Chen (1999) considers the interplay between negative payo¤ external-
ities (due to sequential service constraints) and informational externalities, as
critical in a¤ecting the way depositors use and react to information. In the
paper, uninformed depositors of bank A react to noisy information about bank
Bs performance. Knowing this, the informed agents of the bank A anticipate
that, thanks to the rst-come-rst-serve rule enshrined in the demand deposit
contract, it is optimal for them to withdraw as well, rather than having to wait
for arrival of precise information. Thus, contagious runs occur when uninformed
depositors interpret liquidity withdrawal shocks as (pessimistic) informational
shocks. Panics occur in other banks because of the need for depositors to respond
early to noisy information, due to the presence of negative payo¤ externailities.
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Acharya and Yorulmazer (2002) analyse the interraction between contagion
on the liability side of banks and the ex-ante correlation on the asset side of
banks. Contagion occurs ex-post when bad news in a bank raises the cost of
borrowing for depositors in another bank and makes the other bank illiquid.
Correlation arises endogenously ex-ante, since banks have an incentive to invest
in common investment technologies, so as to maximise the likelihood of joint
common survival. The rationale for this ex-ante behaviour is that, for an in-
dividual bank, individual bank failure is costlier than multiple bank failures.
Thus, for banks that are perceived to be linked, their degree of asset correlation
is high as well.
Vaugirard (2005) considers a case of multiple bank attacks in a setup similar
to Chang and Velasco (2000). The storyline is similar to Chen (1999). In his
paper, home depositors are assumed to have an informational advantage over
foreign lenders regarding the liquidation costs of assets. A bank run in one
country leads foreigners to reassess the liquidation yields in that country and in
other countries as well (the likelihood of bank failure increases with the liquida-
tion yield taking a low value). As a result of the reassessment, banks in another
country becomes illiquid as well and more prone to bank runs. In Vaugirard
(2005), cross country correlation between yields and Bayesian reassessment of
liquidation yields are critical in explaining banking panic spreads.
F. Di¤erences between Interdependence and Contagion
Interdependence
- channel of banking panic transmission (same with crisis as without crisis)
- cross-bank linkages before a nancial crisis (same after a crisis)
Contagion
- new channel of banking panic transmission emerges (conditional on event
observed in rst bank)
- cross-bank linkages after a crisis di¤er from those before
- represented by an endogenous change in correlation / co-movements of
events across banks, conditional on the event in rst bank
F.1 This lack of predictability as to which banking equilibrium will prevail
makes it di¢ cult to study how a bank failure may spread from one bank to
another. Put di¤erently, if a model can predict that, depending on depositors
beliefs formation, any outcome of Bank A can be an equilibrium but it remains
silent about beliefs, it is hardly able to predict how the outcome of bank A can
a¤ect Bank B. Similar problems arise in any international nancial crisis model
with a strong element of self-fullling beliefs. The existence of multiple equilib-
ria makes it very di¢ cult to examine individual bank runs, which compounds
the di¢ culty involved in isolating contagious e¤ects in a multi-bank setting.
Quoting from Vaugirard (2005), ....indeed the key sticking point when trying to
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display pure contagion in models of nancial crises with multiple equilibria and
based solely on self-fullling beliefs, is that the mechanism for jumps between
equilibria, is not articulated. Therefore, these models fail to rigorously capture
contagious e¤ect in which a crisis in one country (i.e the particular outcome
among the set of possible equilibria) a¤ects the likelihood of a crisis in another
country.... There are two theoretical ways out of the conundrum: (a) iden-
tify a particular channel pinning down the cause-e¤ect relationship out of the
whole set of possible multiple outcomes; (b) use global games methodology pi-
oneered by Carlsson and VanDamme (1993) and reformulated by Morris and
Shin (1998) in a model of speculative currency attack to identify the existence
of an equilibrium.
G. Theoretically, this dis-continuity in the international transmission mech-
anism may be caused by panics, asymmetric information or learning. We sub-
sume the notion in the concept of change in behaviourof investors. The notion
of contagion as a state-contingent change in correlation, has implications for di-
versication benets of investors. Leaving aside the banking world and focusing
on nancial markets only, contagion would be viewed, from that perspective, as
a situation of excessiveasset price correlation during crisis times as opposed
to tranquil times. As the argument goes, this means that diversication may
fail to deliver exactly when its benets are needed the most.
H. Brief expose of Dominance Regions
(Strict Lower Dominance Region (SLDR))28 (Fundamental-Based Bank
Failure)

i : [0  i  uG]
	 ) Region of the i   space, for which bank i fails
with probability 1, no matter what the state of the common macroeconomic
fundamental is. Associated with the idiosyncratic fundamental being Too Low
To Succeed.
(Weak Lower Dominance Region (WLDR))

i : u
G < i < u
Bad]
	)
Region of the i space for which bank i fails irrespective of the behaviour of its
patient depositors if and only if the common fundamental is in its bad state.
(Strict Upper Dominance Region (SUDR))29 (Fundamental-Based
Bank Success)

i : [i  uBad + z]
	 ) Region of the i   space, for which
bank i succeeds with probability 1, no matter what the state of the common
macroeconomic fundamental is. Associated with the idiosyncratic fundamental
being Too Large To Fail.
(Weak Upper Dominance Region (WUDR))

i : u
G + z < i  uBad + z]
	)
Region of the i space for which bank i succeeds irrespective of the behaviour
of its patient depositors if and only if the common fundamental is in its good
state.
All four segments put powerful assumptions on the role of i as a driver of
bank is performance. The only di¤erence lies in the interpretation. For SLDR
28

i : minf [i < uG]; [i < uBad]g
	  i : [0  i < uG]	
29

i : max

[i > u
G + z], [i > uBad + z]
		  i : [i > uBad + z]	
62
and SUDR, the precise state that the common macroeconomic variable takes,
does not matter. For SLDR (respectively SUDR), i is so low (respectively
high) that the bank is guaranteed to fail (respectively to succeed). On the other
hand side, with WLDR and WUDR, the state of the common fundamental does
matter. For example, suppose that the state of the common fundamental is
bad. For bank i, any i lying between uG and uBad would be classied as part
of the lower dominance region. If the state of the fundamental was good, i
lying in the

uG; uBad

interval would be part of the segment of i , for which
the banks behaviour would depend on the behaviour of patient depositors. A
similar analysis can explain the rationale for WUDR and SUDR.
I. The negative signal associated with SOC comes from the fact that de-
positors of the second bank may interpret the information in the following way:
if something is wrong in the rst bank and depositors wishing to withdraw are
not getting back their dues due to policy suspension, depositors of the second
bank may also not get back their dues in the future if their bank meets the same
fate tomorrow. After all, the two banks are positively linked to the common
macroeconomic fundamental - they are likely to share the same fate at a later
stage. Thus, the best response of those depositors of the second bank is to with-
draw now. By suspending convertibility in one bank to try to limit contagion,
preventive measures taken at one bank has led to a run on the second bank !
J. The signal could be described as thus: if depositors of the second bank
observe the rst bank receiving nancial aid in the form of LOLR, they may
interpret the information in the following two ways:
(i) They may interpret this as a sign that something is wrong about the
rst bank. Since the two banks are perceived to be connected to the macro
fundamental, they may reckon that their bank (the second bank) may meet the
same fate in the future. So, they decide to withdraw now (Negative Signal)
(ii) They may alternatively interpret this LOLR intervention at the rst
bank as a sign that condence is being maintained in the rst bank through
LOLR and its temporary illiquidity problem is being solved. Therefore, no
spillover e¤ect will be felt in their bank (the second bank) (Positive Signal).
Notice that, in the case of the negative signal, the LOLR being given to the
rst bank has actually created a channel of contagion of its own to the second
bank.
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                     APPENDIX (Graphical) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 : Segregation of  the θi - space into Strict and Weak 
dominance regions 
 
Assume that δi =1 
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Figure 2 (a) : The Relationship between Idiosyncratic Fundamental, 
Common Macroeconomic Fundamentals and (risky) Returns 
Technology for a Bank 
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(2) δi =1 
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Figure 2(b): Common Macroeconomic Fundamental going moving 
from Good (G) to Bad (Bad) State 
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N.B: Refer to Figure 2(d) as to how changes in δi    will affect Returns 
Structure 
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Figure 2(c): An increase in Parameter z: Impact on Returns 
Structure 
 
Assuming:  State of Common Macroeconomic Fundamental: j 
      :   z increases to new level z’ 
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Figure 2(c): A change in Parameter δi : Impact on Returns Structure 
 
Assuming:  State of Common Macroeconomic Fundamental: j 
      :   A  decrease in parameter δi   from 1 to a new level δi, where 
0<δi<1 
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     Figure 3 (a) : Payoff to Staying  v/s  Payoff to Withdrawing         
                                          for a Depositor 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                   
               Figure 3 (b) : Net Payoff to Staying for a Patient Depositor 
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Figure  4:  ‘Autarky’ case / ‘Tranquil’ State   - Assume that the State 
of Common Macroeconomic Fundamental is u 
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Figure  5(a)  Case where the State of the Common  Macroeconomic 
Fundamental is  Bad  
 
 
 
 
 
    θA* 
             
 
 
 
 
 
           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                  
       
 
 
 
 
 
 
.Q 
.O 
      θB*
   
  θ B(FA , uBad) 
. N
. M
.P      Financial Contagion 
    Financial Contagion 
θB*
θ B(SA , 
uBad) 
 
 
 θA* 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 H
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  5(b) : Informational Attributes – Assume Macroeconomic 
Fundamental State is u 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Contagion vs Correlation: Public Informational Dominance  vs  Private 
Informational Dominance 
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Figure  6 :  Case where State of Common Macroeconomic 
Fundamental is Good  
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Figure  7 : (Illustrative purposes only) Conditional on macroeconomic 
fundamental being bad, Negative Contagion exceeds Negative 
Correlation in probabilistic terms 
 
 
 
 
 
(For some arbitrary figures) 
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Figure  8: (Illustrative purposes only) Conditional on macroeconomic 
fundamental being Good, Positive Contagion exceeds Positive 
Correlation in probabilistic terms 
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